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Articles

Counsel for the Accused: Metamorphosis
in Spanish Constitutional Rights
HENRY W. MCGEE, JR.*

Sagradaes, sin duda, la causa de la Sociedad,pero
no lo son menos los derechos individuales. En los

pueblos verdaderamente libres, el ciudadano debe
tener en su mano medios eficaces de defenderse y
conservarsu vida, su libertad,su dignidad,su honor

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 symbolizes the consolidation
of liberal ideals openly ventilated in post-Franco Spain. At the same
time, its substantive achievements are of signal consequence. For students both of human rights and of constitutionalism, the Spanish
Constitution provides a unique and fascinating case study of the ways
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B. Sci. Jour. 1954, Northwestern University; J.D. 1957, DePaul University; LL.M. 1970, Columbia University. The
research for this article was conducted in part while the author was Visiting Professor, University of Madrid (Complutense) Faculty of Law, in 1982, on a grant from the Council for International and Comparative Studies, the Fulbright Agency. He 'gratefully acknowledges
invaluable assistance from Professor Luis Arroyo Zapatero of the University of Madrid (Complutense) Faculty of Law; and from Mr. Everardo Vargas Valencia, J.D. 1985, UCLA School
of Law, and Mr. John F. Gardner, J.D. 1987, UCLA School of Law, both of whom studied at
the University of Madrid (Complutense) before attending law school.
1. Peces-Barba del Brio, La Asistencia Letradaal Detenido o Preso: Un Derecho Constitucional,ACTUALIDAD JURIDICA 35, 36 (1981) (quoting Alonso Martinez) ("Without a doubt
the cause of society is sacred, but no less so are individual rights. In nations truly free, the
citizen must have in his hands effective means to defend and preserve his life, his liberty, his
dignity, his honor .. "). (All translations from Spanish to English are by the author unless
otherwise noted.) Alonso Martinez was Minister of Justice in Spain at the time its Code of
Criminal Procedure was adopted in 1882. The Code still constitutes the basis of Spain's criminal justice process.
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in which political currents shape the growth of legal and constitutional rights. In the United States, the expansion of constitutional
liberty has principally occurred through the process of judicial decision-making, which-although it appears to proceed inexorably from
neutral principles-frequently conceals the impact of ideology and
political persuasion. z The Spanish Constitution, in contrast, expressly
allocates to the national legislature the resolution of critical issues of
constitutional rights.3

The Constitution's declaration of the right of counsel in the criminal justice process, which is expressed without equivocation in article
17.3, contains the all-important proviso that:
Any person arrested must be informed immediately, and in
a manner understandable to him, of his rights and of the
grounds for his arrest, and may not be compelled to make a
statement. The arrested person shall be guaranteed the
assistance of a lawyer during the police inquiries and judicial
4
proceedings, under the terms to be laid down by the law.
The genesis of terms defining the right to legal assistance for those
charged with a crime presents an excellent opportunity to trace the
evolution of an ideal from initial conception to concrete articulation.
The process of delineation has been essentially administrative and legislative, although the Spanish judiciary has provided some reinforcement of the underlying concept as it has exercised and affirmed its
power of judicial review. This article, therefore, emphasizes the give
and take in the political process that generated the amendments to the
Code of Criminal Procedure which implement the constitutional right
to counsel, rather than the process of judicial review which will continue to define that right.
The article begins with a discussion of the social and political
background that influenced the emergence of the constitutionally
2. American constitutional developments can be contrasted with both recent and past
Spanish practice. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 89.
3. CONSTITUCION [CONsT.] art. 53, para. I (Spain) declares: "The rights and liberties
recognized in Chapter Two are binding on all public authorities. The exercise of such rights

and liberties, which shall be protected in accordance with the provision of article 161 [which
provides for judicial review of the constitutionality of laws and regulations], may be regulated
only by law, which shall, in any case, respect their essential content."

4. CONsT. art. 17.3 (emphasis added). Article 17 provides for implementation of its provisions by legislation in three places. Apart from article 17.3, such provisions also appear in
article 17.1 ("Every person has a right to freedom and security. No one may be deprived of his
freedom except in accordance with the provisions of this article and only in the cases and in
the manner provided by the law.") and article 17.4 ("A habeus corpus procedure shall be
regulated by law in order to ensure the immediate handing over to the judicial authorities of
any person arrested illegally.").
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guaranteed right to counsel in Spanish law. Next, it traces the constitutional development and legislative refinements of the right to counsel. It then considers judicial refinements of that right. The article
concludes with a comparison of the Spanish process of articulating
the right to counsel with the parallel process in the United Statesand what such differences bode for U.S. scholars.
II.

EMERGENCE OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN SOCIAL AND
HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A. Adoption of the Spanish Constitution
In the 1930s, the democratic government of Spain was overthrown by a right-wing regime led by Francisco Franco in a civil war
which historians now regard as the prelude to the Second World War.
Franco's death in 1975 ended four decades of government by decree.Formal work on the 1978 Constitution, the first to institutionalize democracy in Spain, commenced after the election of the Spanish
Parliament, known as the Cortes, on June 15, 1977.6 The date
marked the first free parliamentary election in Spain in forty-one
years.7

The 1978 Spanish Constitution was the product of cooperation
among members of the country's four major national parties: the
Uni6n de Centro Democr~tico (UCD), a centrist coalition of social
democrats and liberals; the Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol
(PSOE), a coalition of socialists and social democrats; the Partido
Comunista de Espafia (PCE), a communist party somewhat akin to
other Western European communist parties; and the Alianza Popular
(AP), a right-wing, pro-Franco party. Regional parties also figured
prominently in the process: the Basque Nationalists (ETA) (the most
prominent) and the Catalan Democrats (PNV).8
The PCE and the PSOE had existed in some form throughout
the Franco regime. They thus entered the transition to democracy
with previously established ideologies, organizational hierarchies,
public images, and historical traditions. Their primary goal at this
stage was to modify their public image from clandestine to legitimate
in order to gain voter approval. 9
5. See generally H. THOMAS, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1961).
6. R. GUNTHER, G. SANI & G. SHABAD, SPAIN AFTER FRANCO: THE MAKING OF A
COMPETITIVE PARTY SYSTEM 37 (1986) [hereinafter SPAIN AFTER FRANCO].
7. Payne, Representative Government in Spain: The HistoricalBackground, in SPAIN AT
THE POLLS, 1977, 1979, AND 1982 26 (H. Penniman & E. Mujal-Le6n eds. 1985) [hereinafter
SPAIN AT THE POLLS].
8. SPAIN AFTER FRANCO,

9. Id. at 58-77.

supra note 6, at 37-145.
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In contrast to the PCE and the PSOE, the UCD and the AP had
been created during the transitional period between Franco's death
and the first elections. Neither group had any pre-existing organizational structure, ideology or public image. Without such constraints,
the parties' options were greater but their internal decision-making
process was also more complex.10
The UCD was hastily assembled at the last minute to capitalize
on the enormous popularity of Adolfo Su~rez, and to make a platform
for his candidacy, which he announced on May 2, 1977.11 The UCD
was a broad coalition of groups which included the moderate opposition to Franco and the reformists who had actually been part of the
Franco regime itself, as well as a wide variety of non-Marxist, liberal
social democratic, Christian democratic and monarchist groups. 2 It
was able to capitalize on the public's poor reception of the AP and to
garner some of the left-of-center non-Marxist vote and part of the
13
right-of-center conservative vote at the same time.
Formed on October 9, 1976, the AP reflected a shift to the right
after Sudrez became Prime Minister, and was formed by the so-called
"respectable right," who feared that the excessive liberalization of the
UCD would undermine Spanish economic development and the sense
14
of law and order considered to be one of Franco's greatest legacies.
The AP came to be perceived as a coalition of elite extremists. The
party's platform was not very different from that of the UCD; what
differed was the public's perception of the AP's leaders as elitist
extremists who were part of the unpopular past.15
The Cortes appointed a seven-member committee, representing
Spain's major political parties, to prepare the draft of the Constitution. 16 The committee consisted of three members of then Premier
Adolfo Sudrez's UCD, a rightist member of the opposition, a socialist,
a communist, and a Catalan. In establishing this procedure, the Cortes intended the representatives from each party to discuss and debate
each constitutional issue until they reconciled their differences and
reached a consensus.1 7 All the parliamentary parties, except the
Basque Nationalist Party, which was not represented on the commit10. Id. at 78-107.
11.

E. ARANGO, THE SPANISH POLITICAL SYSTEM: FRANCO'S LEGACY 260 (1978).

12. SPAIN AFTER FRANCO, supra note 6, at 92-93.
13. Id. at 103; E. ARANGO, supra note 11, at 260-61.
14. SPAIN AFTER FRANCO, supra note 6, at 78-92.

15. Id. at 91-92.
16. Id. at 37-39.
17. Pina, Shaping the Constitution, in SPAIN AT THE POLLS, supra note 7, at 34-35.
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tee, backed this strategy of consensus. 18
This give-and-take approach to drafting a constitution was new
to Spain. The last eight constitutions had been shaped primarily by
the political party which happened to be in power at the time of drafting; those parties not in power had few legitimate means of voicing
their opposition to particular provisions.
Attempting to draft a single document that satisfied a variety of
political parties, however, was not without its problems. Reducing
the demands of the different parties into a unified body of fundamental principles was a laborious process. Consensus was hard to reachafter the first draft was published, 1,133 amendments were offered.
On March 16, 1978, the committee finished its work on the draft
and transmitted it to a constitutional commission of 36 parliamentary
deputies. The commission approved its own draft of the Constitution
in twenty-four sessions held between May 5 and June 20, 1978. On
October 30, 1978, the Constitution was sent to the Cortes, where it
was overwhelmingly approved. The lower house ratified the Constitution by a vote of 325 to 6, with 14 abstentions. The Senate vote was
228 to 5, with 8 abstentions. When the Constitution went before
Spain's 21 million voters in a referendum, 87% of those who voted
supported it. Less than 9% voted against it. King Juan Carlos signed
the Constitution on December 27, 1978, and it took effect the following year. Approval and promulgation of the Constitution marked the
official end of autocracy in Spain. 19
The Constitution addresses several historically divisive issues: it
defines the Spanish government as a parliamentary monarchy, establishes the relationship between church and state, specifies the degree
of political and administrative autonomy of various regions, establishes freedom of the press, abolishes the death penalty, and legalizes
divorce. 20
B.

Social and Political Turmoil

Despite passage of the modern Constitution, the struggle
between frustrated adherents to an authoritarian past and the forces
of modernization, or "Europeanization, ' ' 2 1 maintained a pervasive
18. Id. at 31-32, 46. King Juan Carlos was instrumental in implementing this procedure,
and it has subsequently been referred to as his method of "consensus politics." Id. at 31-33.
19. See ParliamentFirmly Backs New Charterfor Spain, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1978, at
A24, col. 1.
20. SPAIN AFTER FRANCO, supra note 6, at 114-24.
21. The "Europeanization" of Spain had in fact begun more than a decade before
Franco's death. Its roots can be traced back to the 1950s. While Francoist Spain was often
isolated from cultural trends north of the Pyrenees, during the dictator's last years Spanish
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undercurrent of friction in Spain's public and private life. Evidence of
social modernization was apparent to the casual observer: pornogra-

phy was openly displayed for sale at kiosks throughout Madrid and
Barcelona;2 2 topless bathing was the preference of more than half of

female sunbathers on Spanish beaches;1 3 and Spain was the first European nation to legalize the use of marijuana.2 4 On a more fundamen-

tal level, the most repressive of Franco's laws were quickly abolished
by the new government.
Despite such changes in the social fabric, the Spanish transition
from autocracy to democracy is far from complete. Moreover, the
progress to date has not been without reversals. One writer has
observed,
A striking aspect of Spain's transition from dictatorship
to democracy has been its evolutionary pace. The old institutions-the civil service, the judiciary, the armed forcesremained in place ....
Democracy has been achieved in
small steps, by improvisation and consensus.
As a practical matter, this has meant that for a time the
old order would exert a hidden influence. Many Spaniards
sum up this sense of influence, of shadowy forces of reaction
whose loyalty to the democratic Constitution is suspect, in
the expression "poderes ffctitos"-the real powers. They
are usually categorized into three groups-the church, the
society experienced a gradual opening, particularly among the youth. This opening was due in
large part to the influence of increasing numbers of tourists from Western Europe and the
United States. With the institution of democracy, however, a still-cloistered Spanish society
was overwhelmed with the excesses of the new cultural freedom, including punk rockers, and
R- and X-rated movies and shows. R. CARR & J. Fusi, SPAIN: DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOC-

RACY 125 (1979). See also Putnam, Madrid: The Change in Spain, 169 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
MAG. 142 (Feb. 1986). The last vestiges of isolation will be purged with the admission of Spain
into NATO and the Common Market.
22. R. CARR & J. Fusi, supra note 21, at 132.
23. "During the 1940s and 1950s, the government campaigned against what it called
'disagreeable spectacles' at beaches and swimming pools ....
Offenders were liable to a fine,
arrest and detention. But in the summer of 1978, nearly three years after Franco's death, nude
sunbathing was made legal in nature camps and Spain's gradual transition to democracy confirmed the vogue for the bikini and 'monokini.'" Going Topless in Spain, San Francisco
Chron., July 27, 1983, at 12, col. 4.
24. "Spain became the first nation in Europe to legalize the use of marijuana. So far, the
new drug law has been well received. Criticism from Spain's rightist opposition groups has
been surprisingly muted, and the Roman Catholic Church has virtually ignored the whole
issue." Guess Which Country Has Legalized Pot, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1983, at 40.
25. E. GIMBERNAT ORDEIG, INTRODUCCION A LA PARTE GENERAL DEL DERECHO
PENAL ESPAIFOL 20 (1979) (The new government struck down laws that forbade criticism of
the death penalty; lessened the penalty, for the military offense of conscientious objection;
repealed the crimes of adultery, homosexuality, and fornication; legalized the sale of contraceptives; and outlawed the death penalty.).

1987]

COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED

army and the financiers. The reason the transition has been
so smooth for the most part, but also the reason there is
doubt that it has been totally achieved, is that to some
degree these powers remain.
"The political transition came to an end with the
Socialist victory in October 1982," said Angel Vifias, a wellknown political theorist. "For the first time in our political
history the true antagonists to those in power came to
power. Now we are in the period of structural change, the
attempt to change the institutions, which is a more prolonged struggle."
Francoism is almost dead as an ideology. But it lives
on in the institutional lethargy in the civil service, a sense of
autonomy in the conservative military establishment, and an
old-boy network of entrepreneurs accustomed to taking
shortcuts in financial dealings. There is also a nostalgic
longing among some Spaniards for a strong hand to deal
with mounting economic problems, rising crime, looser
morality, and demands for greater self-rule by Basques and
26
other groups.
Occasionally the conflict between competing interests would
erupt openly. The most dramatic incident was an attempted coup
d'6tat in 1981. During the attempted coup, led by Civil Guard Lt.
Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, members of the legislature and cabinet were held hostage for some eighteen hours before the government,
led by King Juan Carlos, succeeded in defusing the situation. The
attempted coup was described as "el golpe, the blow from hard-line
franquista officers that had hung like a shadow over Spanish political
life since the transition to parliamentary government began with
Franco's death. While the rest of Spanish society has been caught in a
rapid whirl of liberalization, the military establishment has remained
almost untouched, a monument to the past."2 7 The suppression of the
26. Darnton, A Modern Spain by Evolution, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1984, § 4, at 4, col. 3.
See generally, R. CARR & J. Fusi, supra note 21; J. TOHARIA, MODERNIZATION, AUTHORITARIANISM AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN SPAIN (1974).

27. TIME, Mar. 9, 1981, at 8, 9 (Atlantic ed.). See generally J. BELLVER, EL EJERCITO
CALLA (1981); J. BUSQUETS, 1932 - EL GOLPE (1981); L. MARTIN PRIETO, 1944 - TECNICA
DE UN GALOPE DE ESTADO (1982);

P. URBANO, CON LA VENIA-YO INDAGUE EL 23-F

(1982). As the attack commenced, the deputies in the 350-member Congreso were attempting
to resolve a crisis triggered by the unexpected resignation of Prime Minister Adolfo Su~rez the

month before. The Congreso was about to confirm a new Prime Minister-Leopoldo CalvoSotelo from Suirez's ruling UCD-when the armed gunmen led by Lt. Col. Tejero Molina
stormed into the chamber. Calvo-Sotelo, who had been expected before the coup to gain confirmation by less than a majority, won an absolute majority after the suppression of the coup
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insurrection-and the conviction and imprisonment of its leader-did
not end the schism between liberal and authoritarian Spain. z8
There were also widespread allegations of police brutality and
the torture of prisoners.2 9 In the summer of 1975 (several months
before Franco's death), Amnesty International called upon Spanish
authorities to halt both abuses in the judicial process and widespread
torture of prisoners. 30 Amnesty International had found such abuses
consistently practiced by anti-terrorist forces battling the independence movement in the Basque provinces. 3 1 In 1979, Amnesty International again investigated the criminal justice process in Spain and
found that the struggle against terrorism had continued to involve
human rights abuses. 32 Noting that Spain had ratified the Internabecause of the backing of regional parties which had previously abstained from voting. Even
the opposition Socialists led by Felipe Gonzalez offered to join the government. The offer was
declined. See The Night of the Generals, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1981, at 34.
The next year the Socialists swept all of Spain in a triumphant, unprecedented and
extraordinary victory. In five years, the Socialists increased their vote from 5 to 10 million,
reflecting an increase from 30% of the total votes cast in 1979 to 46% of those cast in 1982.
The centrist UCD collapsed completely: their vote fell from 35% in 1979 to 7% in 1982. The
Communist Party also fell apart: their vote likewise plummeted from 11% in 1979 to 4% in
1982. Only the right-wing AP, led by former Franco cabinet member Manuel Fraga, gained
strength during this period: its portion of the vote increased from 6% to 25%. Barnes,
McDonough & Pina, The Development of Partisanshipin New Democracies: The Case of
Spain, 29 AM. J. POL. Sci. 695 (1985).
28. On June 3, 1982, the Supreme Council of Military Justice sentenced 22 army and
civil guard officers to sentences ranging from 1 year to 30 years. Army Lt. General Jaime
Milans del Bosch and Civil Guard Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero Molina both received sentences of
30 years. Milans del Bosch had served in Franco's Blue Division on the German-Russian
Front in World War II, and was related to Tejero Molina by marriage. Milans del Bosch,
Tejero Molina and eight other officers were expelled from the military. El Pais, June 4, 1982,
at 1, col. 1.
Reaction to the sentence was mixed. The left-wing journal Diario 16 concluded that the
sentence was too light. Diario 16, June 4, 1982, at 1, col. 5. A columnist for the right-wing
paper, El Alcazar, declared the sentence too heavy for "men that the prosecution reported
were moved by the love of their country." El Alcazar, June 4, 1982, at 1, col. 3. And in an
editorial expressing general dissatisfaction with the outcome of the proceedings, El Pais, the
left of center newspaper widely considered the paper of record in Spain, commented: "[I]t
would be an offense to the patriotism of democratic Spaniards that anyone would speak well of
the rebels of February 23 who could kidnap the representatives of the nation using the name of
Spain as an excuse for their crime." Sentence for a MilitaryRebellion, El Pais, June 5, 1982, at
10, col. 3.
29.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION

TO SPAIN 3 (1975).
30. Id. at 14.
31. Id. at 6-7. A U.S. lawyer and a German philosophy professor undertook the investigations for Amnesty International. Requests to interview prisoners who were alleged torture
victims in the city of Bilbao were denied, and the report of the investigators expressed their
regret that they did not obtain the opportunity "to test some of the most damaging allegations
of torture." Id. at 3-4.

32.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION

TO SPAIN 1, 52 (1980). The second study occurred in October 1979. The investigative team
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tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and had signed
the European Convention on Human Rights in April 1977, and that
Spanish legislation enacted in 1978 had outlawed torture, Amnesty
International criticized the continued maltreatment of prisoners and
the prolonged delay in bringing suspects to court after arrest.3 3 The
1979 report pointed to some improvement in the treatment of prison-

ers in the period of amnesty following Juan Carlos' accession to the
Spanish throne, but noted a significant subsequent deterioration in the
human rights situation. 4
Within three years of Amnesty International's second investiga-

tion, a study by the prestigious Spanish Human Rights Association
found that torture by both the Civil Guard and local police per-

sisted.35 The organization regarded as indispensable the abolition of
legal rules that authorized detention for ten days prior to a judicial
hearing. More importantly, it insisted that the right to counsel
needed to be made "irrenunciable" (i.e., not subject to waiver).3 6 By

1983, judicial investigations were underway in Madrid to determine
circumstances of alleged brutality in several unrelated cases.3 7

consisted of two Danish physicians and their interpreter, a German lawyer, and an Amnesty
International investigator whose nationality was not disclosed, but who was evidently fluent in
Spanish. Id. at 2.
33. Id. at 1-2. The report acknowledged that the dramatic change in political institutions in Spain had involved intense and bloody struggles between extremists on the left and on
the right, and between regional nationalists and the army. Amnesty International condemned
both the practice of assassination employed by various armed groups and the torture of those
detained by the forces of the state. Id. at 1.
34. Id. at 2. This deterioration was thought to have resulted from the implementation of
laws designed to cope with terrorist activities. Id. Between 1969 and 1980, terrorist assassinations caused 328 deaths. A. KRASIKOV, FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 136 (1984).
Another source put the number killed between 1968 and 1983 at 558. L.A. Times, Feb. 25,
1984, § 1, at 12, col. 1. Most terrorist acts occurred in northern provinces such as the Basque
country and Catalonia. A. KRASlKOV, supra, at 135-37. Attacks on police and public facilities
were not uncommon in other parts of Spain, including Madrid. See id. at 136.
35. Report of the Spanish Association for Human Rights (1982), summarized in El Pais,
Dec. 10, 1982, at 18, col. 1.
36. Id. The demand was to be codified in article 520.5 of the judicial code. See hifra text
accompanying notes 111-20.
37. For example, one prisoner alleged that he had been threatened that his wife would be
forced to abort, and that electrodes had been applied to his genitals. Another asserted that he
had been hung alternately by his hands and by his feet, which had then been burned. Medical
evidence was offered to corroborate the nature and extent of his injuries. El Pais, Mar. 30,
1983, at 13, col. 1. The alleged victims were all denied lawyers until after they had been
presented to an examining magistrate.
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C. Emergence of the Right to Counsel
1. Historical Antecedents
No antecedent to article 17.3 of the 1978 Constitution guaranteeing the right to counsel 38 can be found in any of Spain's previous constitutions. The most closely analogous safeguards required that notice
of imprisonment be given to the family members of the accused within
seventy-two hours, 39 and that the accused be informed of the charge
against him and the name of his accuser within twenty-four hours of
his imprisonment.4 0 Aside from these few rights, Spanish constitutions and laws were silent on the right to counsel.
Nonetheless, one Spanish scholar, Gregorio Peces-Barba del
Brio, has called the right to counsel an "old aspiration" of the Bar of
Spain.4" The "foundation" of the right is said to be the presumption
of innocence recognized in article 24 of the 1978 Constitution.4 2
Some eight years before the present Constitution took effect, a congress of Spanish lawyers declared that lawyers should be present at
43
the inception of the criminal justice process to assist those arrested.
This conception of the rights of the accused was affirmed in the Code
of Criminal Procedure of December 1978, which was enacted shortly
before the Constitution was promulgated." The Code provides that
as soon as a person is detained, he has the right to designate a lawyer
for his defense and to demand the lawyer's presence during any interrogation that might ensue.4 5
Despite the Code provisions, police typically notified the suspect's lawyer of the detention but did not allow the lawyer access to
38. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
39. CONSTITUCION (1931) [1931 CONST.] art. 29 (Spain). The provision was a repetition
of Article 3 of the 1869 Constitution.
40. Id.
41. Peces-Barba del Brio, supra note 1, at 35.
42. See generally J.M. SERRANO ALBERCA, COMENTARIOS A LA CONSTITUCION 219

(1980).
43. Peces-Barba del Brio, supra note 1, at 35, 40.
44. LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL (Code of Criminal Procedure) [L.E. CRIM.]

(Spain). Articles 520 and 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were adopted December 4,
1978, and became effective on December 9, 1978, three weeks before the Constitution was
promulgated. They were then conformed to the Constitution by the legislation which is the
subject of this article. See Joaquin Llobel Muedra, La Modification de los Arts. 520y 527de la
Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminalpor la Ley Organica 14/1983, de 12 de Diciembre, LA LEY,

May 15, 1984, at 1 (Afio 5, Nfimero 937). The General Prison Law of September 26, 1979
established related laws applicable to prisoners.
45. L.E. CRIM. art. 520.2 requires: "From the moment his detention is carried out or his
imprisonment is determined, the person affected has the right to designate his attorney and to
ask that he be present at the place of custody in order to assist him during the interrogation, to
request the reading of this Article and to participate in any process of identification of which

he may be the object."
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the suspect. If the suspect was released, the police and the lawyer
would ordinarily not come into contact again.46 Only in the case of
continued detention would the suspect receive the assistance of coun-

sel and, even then, a substantial number of prisoners rejected offers of
legal assistance even though lawyers were actually present.47 As will
be explored subsequently, "No hablarisiesta mi abogado" has been a
depressing refrain in Spanish police stations.4 8
Thus, during the period in which legislation was under consideration, the role of the lawyer in the criminal process was anything but
clear, and dissatisfaction with the contradiction between constitutional principle and contemporary police practice was pervasive, at
least among the organized bar.
2. Police Practices with Respect to Detainees
Scarcely had the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure been
amended to provide for the assistance of counsel in the initial stages of

police and judicial proceedings, 49 when there began a steady decline in
the ratio of prisoners who accepted legal representation to those who
rejected counsel. 50 Indeed, two phenomena emerged during the
46. El Pais, Mar. 30, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
47. A 1982 Report of the Spanish Human Rights Association revealed that in Madrid,
46% of detainees, "having been induced for the most part to believe that they could be
prejudiced [if they accepted legal assistance]," waived the right to counsel. The report added
that more than 80% of detainees waived the right to counsel in other areas of Spain. El Pais,
Dec. 10, 1982, at 18, col. 1 (original emphasis).
48. "If this is my lawyer, I won't talk." El Pais, May 16, 1982, at 22, col. 1. On the
occasion of the first anniversary of socialist rule, 159 lawyers signed a newspaper opinion column entitled "Against the Minister of the Interior," which declared:
We, lawyers involved in the defense of individual and collective rights of the
citizens, wish to express our deep concern with the regressive role the Minister of the
Interior, Sefior Barrionuevo, has played all year through his actions relative to public
order.
After citing several acts of the Minister and drawing parallels to incidents which occured
under Franco's rule, the lawyers argued that:
the initiatives and acts are inseparable from a determined state policy, denominated
citizen security, that the Socialist government shares in its entirety and whose deep
sense is to force the establishment of a new social consensus based on the subordination, accepted seriously, by the citizens. For us, lawyers daily engaged in the difficult
task of defending liberty, especially intolerable is the continued erosion of democratic
rights and liberties in the name of a logic of repression understood as the only answer
possible to the social, economic and national contradictions levied by the Spanish
state.
M. Teresa Aguado Hernindez, Contra el Ministeriodel Interior,El Pais, Dec. 10, 1983, at 16,
col. I (original emphasis).
49. L.E. CRIM. arts. 520, 527. See supra note 44.
50. See Gor, Progressive Increase in "Waivers" of Legal Assistance by Detainees Concerns
Legal Establishment, El Pais, Apr. 2, 1982, at 30, col. 1. The number of prisoners who
accepted legal representation fell from a peak of 817 in March 1979, a year after the law was
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period from 1979 to 1981. The number of prisoners who accepted
lawyers dipped overall, and although there were seasonal variations,
the monthly total generally remained in the five hundreds. However,
with slight fluctuations, the number of detainees rejecting counsel
increased steadily so that after March 1981, the number of persons
who declined representation continually outnumbered those who
accepted legal assistance. 1
The rising number of detainees rejecting counsel coincided with a
rise in the number of detentions. In 1982, one Spanish jurist termed
detention "almost a national sport," and in suggesting that the police
should be auxiliaries of the judiciary, implied that the reverse was the
case." Statistics paint a bleak picture. In December 1978, the very
month the Constitution was promulgated, there were 10,483 persons
in prison. More than 20,000 were in Spanish prisons by the end of
1980. Thus, the prison population doubled in little more than two
years.5 3 One commentator noted that "this dizzying number of prisoners, without precedent in peace-time Spain, has no counterpart in
Western Europe. ' 5 4 As the crime rate increased,5 5 the criminal justice machinery began to creak under the strain of a growing prison
population. It was not uncommon to hear that the relatively few prisoners in the relatively crime-free Franco era had received better treatpromulgated, to a low of 365 in September of the same year. During 1980, the highest figure
was in March, when 648 prisoners accepted legal assistance; this figure dipped to a low of 382
in April. The following year, the number of acceptances oscillated between 567 and 394. But
the number of persons who rejected lawyers rose steadily from 227 in January 1979 to 689 in
November 1981. Id.
51. In November 1981, there were 689 refusals and 557 acceptances. Id.
52. This criticism of detention was expressed by Jesfis Vicente Chamorro, fiscal of the
Supreme Tribunal, in an address sharply critical of the anti-terrorist laws, which he delivered
to an international conference of lawyers in Vitoria on December 15, 1982. El Pais, Dec. 16,
1982, at 19, col. 1.
53. G. Martinez-Fresneda, Las Garantas de la Defensa en los Juicios Penales, 1 (July,
1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia Journalof TransnationalLaw).
54. Id.
55. See generally Morenilla Rodriquez, Tendencies del Delitoy Estrategiaparasu Prevencidn en Espaffa, in CUADERNOS DE POLITICA CRIMINAL 49 (1981). Dr. Morenilla Rodriquez
writes that:
[T]here exists in Spain the general belief that crime has experienced an "alarming" growth in the last five years [since 1976]. Mediums of social communication,
the attitudes of the public in large cities and the activity of the institutions to uphold
the law and the administration of criminal justice daily reveal this view.
Id.
His article confirms the perceived rise in crime and predicts even higher crime rates in the
1980s because of the persistence of socio-political and socio-economic problems that attended
the growth in crime between 1975 and 1979. As Letrado of the Ministry of Justice, Dr.
Morenilla Rodriquez was a major architect of the research and drafting that formed the basis
of the pre-socialist governmental proposals to implement article 17.3 of the Constitution of
1978.
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ment, at least in the course of non-political prosecutions, than
prisoners under the democratic and ostensibly
more liberal criminal
56
justice system of the constitutional era.
3. Activism by the Organized Bar
Spain's struggle to deal effectively with its crime rate and the
integrity of the criminal justice system was carried out in the midst of
wrenching social and political transformation. Human rights abuses
and heavy-handed police tactics brought about a progressive worsening in relations between the organized bar and the police forces. Evidence of the change may be seen in the reaction of Spanish lawyers to
what were widely perceived as repressive aspects of the criminal justice system. The deteriorating relationship between defense lawyers
and police prompted more than a hundred lawyers belonging to the
Young Lawyers of the Madrid Colegio (Grupo de Abogados Jovenes
Colegio de Madrid) to lock themselves up in the office of the Colegio
de Abogados de Madrid in protest of (1) the detention by police of a
lawyer who attempted to mediate a dispute between police and some
citizens who were eventually arrested, (2) a mass arrest of some five
hundred persons, less than a hundred of whose cases were eventually
referred for judicial disposition, and especially (3) police practices
which made the defense of those charged with crimes nearly impossible. 5 7 The demonstration occurred shortly after publication of a fullpage advertisement in Spain's most influential newspaper, El Pais, in
which the Second National Congress of Young Lawyers decried the
downgrading of the function of defense attorneys and the tendency to
identify advocates with their clients. The advertisement demanded
that the right of assistance of counsel be made unwaivable 8
Even after the compromise which resulted in passage, by the
Socialist-dominated Cortes, of legislation guaranteeing the right to
counsel in criminal cases, Spanish lawyers remained a significant
source of agitation to complete the revolution in criminal procedure
commenced by the 1978 Constitution and its implementing legislation. By 1982, lawyers were openly protesting what they regarded as
intolerable restrictions on the practice of criminal law. In January
1982, the Colegio de Abogados de Madrid urged the adoption of
measures that would protect the representation of accused persons in
the police precincts of the city and in the detention facilities for sus56. G. Martinez-Fresneda, supra note 53, at 17. Martinez-Fresneda actually compares

the conditions which existed in the late 1970s to the secret prisons of the Spanish Inquisition.
See also J. LLORENTE, 1 HISTORIA CRITICA DE LA INQUISICION EN ESPANA 229-30 (1980).

57. El Pais, May 19, 1982, at 29, col. 1.
58. El Pais, Apr. 3, 1982, at 19, col 1.
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pected terrorists.5 9 Their demands underscored the depth of the distrust that existed between the bar and the law enforcement
establishment.
Essentially, defense lawyers sought untrammeled access to their
clients and an active role in police processes. They were joined in
what became a sort of legal rights movement by those forces on the
left which sought greater liberalization of Spanish society and by
political groups from beyond Madrid which sought greater autonomy.
In many ways, the struggle over the right to counsel became a part of
the larger struggle for liberation from the vestiges of authoritarianism.
An editorial which appeared in El Pais declared that the lawyers
were not just vindicating professional self-interest and that "eradication of torture is one of the imperatives of a civilized society," and
charged that "torture continues, dressed anew in the euphemism
'maltreatment,' and that faced with torture, the public authorities,
' 60
most prominently the Minister of the Interior, take no firm action."
The editorial found it "difficult to comprehend" the restrictions on
the right to counsel proposed by the government, when the presence
of lawyers would place in the hands of the authorities "an instrument
coherent with the demands of the Constitution and the same moral
principles of public function that figure in the socialist program of
which Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez has proclaimed himself a committed servant. ' 61 El Pais harshly criticized the government's proposal for reform, which included a provision limiting the presence of the
lawyer to the formal declaration and identification of the detainee,
and which failed to provide for immediate legal assistance, thereby
leaving an interval between detention and appearance of the lawyer
during which maltreatment could occur.6 z The editorial's fervent
espousal of the use of counsel as a prophylactic against maltreatment
of detainees echoed arguments which had been advanced by legal
commentators for some time.6 3
59. El Pais, Jan. 31, 1982, at 32, col. 1. The lawyers also demanded that the authorities
replace the glass partitions in interview booths with windows that would not impede effective
communication and rapport between lawyer and client. Id. Attention was also directed to the
use of metal detectors, which were ostensibly used to prevent the smuggling of arms into prisons, but which in fact were used only on defense lawyers or the families of prisoners. Martinez-Fresneda also mentions metal detectors and similar obstructions such as the necessity of
communicating with prisoners through microphones. G. Martinez-Fresneda, supra note 53, at
16. The Colegio de Abogados also charged that despite protracted waiting by attorneys, the
prisoners were often not made available to them. El Pais, Jan. 31, 1982, at 32, col. 1.
60. Las Torturasy La Asistencia Letrada, El Pais, Apr. 1, 1983, at 6, col. I.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Martinez-Fresneda, Vigilar los Interrogatorios,El Pais, Jan. 17, 1981, at 19,
col. 1.
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This complex pattern of turbulent social and political currents
provided the backdrop to the four-year debate over the terms of

assistance of counsel. Public perception of the unraveling of Spain's
social fabric, as evidenced by renewed irredentism in the Basque provinces 4 and the long-standing demands for autonomy in Catalonia,65
as well as changing moral attitudes and a general breakdown of the

reigning social order, was reinforced by the steadily mounting body
count of civil guards and policemen.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE LEGISLATIVE

PROCESS

Immediacy of legal assistance, the prisoner's ability to waive the
right to counsel, and the function of the lawyer during the initial
stages of the investigation were the three major issues confronting the
Spanish Parliament as it discharged its constitutionally imposed obligation to set out the terms of the law with respect to article 17.3 of the
1978 Constitution. The desire to affirm basic values of human dignity
and autonomy 66 and the new constitutionalism 67 came into conflict
with the concomitant belief that the fragility of Spanish democracy
required the self-protective capacity to isolate and punish the socially
dangerous. 68 In a social order in which deviance and dissent had been
synonyms for disloyalty, rapid identification and isolation of offenders
who were thought to be dangerous remained an important and conscious goal of the criminal justice system.
64. See A. KRASIKOV, supra note 34, at 137-38.
"Almost all the killing [in the Basque country] took place after the death of Franco as
ETA... tried to exact a separate Basque state from the new democratically elected government of Spain." L.A. Times, Feb. 25, 1984, § 1,at 12, col. 1. See also A. MUNOZ ALONSO, EL
TERRORISMO EN ESPANA (1982).
65. See F. MERCADE, CATALURA, INTELECTUALES POLITICOS Y LA CUESTION
NACIONAL (1982); P. DORADO MONTERO, Los PARTIDOS POLITICOS EN CATALURA: OPINIONES Y PROGRAMAS ANTES DE LAS ELECCIONES DE 15 JUNIO 1977 (1978); B. OLTRA, LA
IDEOLOGIA NACIONAL CATALAIRA (1981).

66. Compare the treatment of human dignity as an element in the discussion of the history of police brutality in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966).
67. See G. MARTINEZ-FRESNEDA, LA CONSTITUCION DE 1978 EN LA HISTORIA DEL
CONSTITUCIONALIsMO ESPANOL 1-2 (1982) for the view that the Franco era was an aberrant
episode in Spanish history and that post-Franco reforms are consistent with European history
generally.
68. Gonzalo Martinez-Fresneda has argued that the rise in the number of prisoners in
Spain (at a rate which he suggests is vertiginous) is not caused by a crisis of criminality in
Europe or Spain. Instead, he contends that the rise in the prison population has more to do
with a deliberate political policy of incarceration which sabotages both the older liberal institutions and the newer constitutional ones "which in theory are the insurmountable redoubt of
the citizen confronting power." G. Martinez-Fresneda, supra note 53, at 2. See also El Pais,
Mar. 23, 1983, at 4, col. 2.
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Articles 520 and 527 of the Code of CriminalProcedure

Before reviewing and analyzing the debates and the ensuing compromise that culminated in the legislation which fleshes out the mandate of assistance of counsel found in article 17.3 of the Constitution,

it is useful at the outset to present a digest of the provisions of sections
520 and 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.6 9
69. L.E. CRIM. art. 520 provides, in its entirety:
1. The detention and provisional detention must be practiced in the manner
least prejudicial to the person, reputation and family name of the detainee or prisoner.
Preventive detention shall not last longer than the time strictly necessary to conduct the investigations which would tend to clarify the facts. Within the time periods
established in the present legislation, and, in any case, a maximum of 72 hours, the
detainee must be freed or put at the disposition of the judicial authorities.
2. Any person detained or incarcerated shall be informed, immediately and in
a comprehensible fashion, regarding the actions attributed to him, and pertaining to
the reason for depriving him of his liberty, as well as his rights, especially the
following:
a) The right to remain silent, not making a statement if he does so desire,
and not answering any question(s) put to him, or making statements only before
a Judge.
b) The right not to incriminate himself.
c) The right to counsel and to request his presence at police precincts and
judicial proceedings so that he may intervene in any identification proceedings
to which he may be submitted. If the detainee does not designate an attorney, a
court appointed attorney shall be designated.
d) The right to contact family or anyone he may desire regarding the
detention and location where he is held in custody at any given time. Foreign
nationals shall have the right to have the above-mentioned circumstances made
known to the Consular Office of their country.
e) The right to be assisted by a free interpreter when dealing with a foreign
national who does not understand or speak Spanish.
f) The right to a medical examination by a forensic physician or a legal
substitute, or in the absence of such by the Institution in which he is found or by
any other State or Public Official.
3. Whenever dealing with a minor or incapacitated individual, the authorities
in whose custody the detained or incarcerated individual is found in the circumstances noted in subsection 2(d) will communicate to whoever may be the parents or
guardians of the same, and if these cannot be located, the "Ministerio Fiscal" will be
notified immediately. If a minor or an incapacitated arrestee is a foreign national, the
fact of his detention will be communicated to the Consular office of his country.
4. The judicial authority or functionaries in whose custody the detained or
incarcerated individual finds himself will refrain from recommendations regarding
the selection of a counsel and will communicate in a verifiable fashion the name of
the designated attorney to the Bar so that he may appear or petition to be designated
counsel. The Bar will notify the designated attorney of the selection so that he may
accept or decline to represent the accused. In the event that the designated attorney
does not accept the petition, is not located, or does not appear, the Bar will proceed
to name qualified counsel. The designated attorney will appear at the place of detainment as soon as possible and in any case within eight hours, beginning from such
time as the Bar is informed.
If eight hours from the time of communication with the Bar has transpired and
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A key aspect of article 520.1 is its requirement that detention last

no longer than necessary to carry out the proceedings designed to
clarify the facts, and that without fail the prisoner must be set free or
taken to court within seventy-two hours. Of equal importance are the
requirements of article 520.2 that those detained be informed immediately about the facts that led to their arrest and that they be advised of

their rights, including the right to remain silent, the right to designate
a lawyer and ask for his presence in the proceedings both at the police
station and before the court (and if no lawyer is requested that one
shall be designated de oficio), the right to have family or friends noti-

fied of the detention, and the right to be examined by a medical doctor
upon detention.7 °

Article 520.4 requires that the authorities not suggest a lawyer
for the detainee, but that the Colegio de Abogados be given the oppor-

tunity to assign a lawyer to represent the accused when he has not
asked for a specific attorney.7 1 The lawyer is required to appear at the

place of detention within eight hours after he has been notified of his
responsibilities. Most importantly, if the lawyer does not appear
no lawyer has arrived at the place of detention without cause, declarations or identification of the detainee may proceed with the consent of the detainee, if the detainee
consents without prejudice to the responsibilities of the designated attorney.
5. Notwithstanding, the detainee or incarcerated individual may renounce the
assistance of counsel if the detention was based on facts susceptible to qualification
exclusively as traffic offenses.
6. Assistance of counsel shall consist of:
a) Requesting that the detainee or incarcerated individual be informed of
his rights as established in subsection 2 of this Article and that the medical
examination indicated in paragraph (f) proceed.
b) Requesting the clarification or amplification of the measures considered
appropriate as well as to state in writing any incident which may have taken
place during the employment of said measures.
c) Interviewing the detainee in private upon the cessation of the interrogation in which he has participated.
This discussion does not dwell on what U.S. readers might view as oratorical flourishes,
such as the requirement of article 520.1 that a detention be carried out in a manner which least
damages the prisoner's person, reputation, or family name. Such provisions are certainly
important as affirmations of cultural values, but it would not serve the purpose of this article to
explore the cultural trappings in which the legislation is dressed.
70. Article 520.2(d)-(e) also provides for free interpreters when the accused does not
speak Spanish, and, if the detainee is a minor, for notification of the family, the guardian, or
person exercising parental authority. If the minor is a foreigner, the Consul of the minor's
nation shall also be advised.
71. On the local level, assistance to detainees is carried out through the district Colegios
de Abogados. The offices are located in the Juzgados de Instrucci6n (court of first instance) or
other legal center of the district. Detainees have been critical of the lawyers in the program,
often claiming that they generally are too young and inexperienced. On the other hand, many
police officials, "out of ignorance and fear," allow themselves to be manipulated by the attending lawyers. Letter from Madrid lawyer Juan M. Cruz Palacios to Professor McGee (Nov. 15,
1986) (on file with the Columbia Journalof TransnationalLaw).
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within eight hours, the authorities may commence the examination of
the detainee upon his consent. Finally, the detainee may waive or
reject the assistance of counsel only in traffic offenses.
The final subsection of article 520 defines "assistance of counsel"
as consisting of advising the prisoner of the rights described in article
520.2 (which have presumably been brought to his attention by the

police), asking the authorities to clarify or amplify any material that
may have been dealt with during the interrogation, and thereafter privately and confidentially interviewing the prisoner after the proceedings have been terminated.7 2

Article 52773 provides that those persons detained incommunicado pursuant to the antiterrorist law74 shall have the right to a lawyer designated by the Colegio de Abogados and the right to a

confidential interview but shall not have the other rights set out
above.
B.

Legislative History
The crucial aspects of the law on the right to counsel are the

provisions which permit the police to proceed with interrogation of
the suspect before the lawyer arrives at the station, but which make
the right to counsel a right which can not be waived. 75 The provision
72. L.E. CRIM. art. 520.6.
73. L.E. CRIM. art. 527. The article provides, in its entirety:
The detainee or prisoner, while being held incommunicado, shall not enjoy the
rights expressed in the present chapter, with the exception of those rights established
in Article 520, with the following modifications:
a) An attorney shall be appointed in all cases.
b) The detainee shall not have the right of communication provided for in subsection d) of number 2.
c) Neither shall the detainee have the right of consultation with his attorney
provided for in subsection c) of number 5.
74. The relationship between the right to counsel and those held incommunicado pursuant to the laws against terrorism was perhaps the focus of the debate on the use of lawyers for
those accused of crimes. This article deals only peripherally with the larger issue of terrorism,
which has few parallels in the United States. The treatment of the detainee held incommunicado constantly inflamed discussion about the right to counsel. For example, El Pais decried
as the "great failure" of article 527 its augmentation of the possibility of torture by the
extended delay of 10 days in presenting the detainee to a judge and the lack of legal assistance.
The newspaper bitterly charged that the Socialists had changed their position on the use of
habeas corpus as a legal device to prevent torture and charged that the government's reliance
on the presumption of innocence to protect such detainees was "totally inconsistent." Finally,
the paper condemned as the "second great failure of the law" its stripping of those charged as
armed terrorists of the right to have their families notified or, more seriously, the right to
designate their lawyers. The government's rationale that "the defense of society" required the
extraordinary exceptions was scorned as impugning the presumed good faith of lawyers as a
class. Finally, the paper called for a challenge to the legislation before the constitutional tribunal if it should pass. El Pais, Oct. 5, 1983, at 10, col. 1.
75. L.E. CRIM. art. 520.2(c) gives the detainee the right to designate an attorney, and if
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permitting interrogation of the suspect prior to the appearance of the
lawyer has a curious history. The original version of article 520,
which was passed the year the Constitution took effect, provided that
the suspect had the right to designate a lawyer to assist him from the
moment of his arrest.7 6 The emphasis was on immediacy. The Ministry of Justice first proposed to strengthen this emphasis by adding
language that would have required all declarations to be made in the
presence of counsel for the accused. The proposal would also have
made the right to counsel unwaivable. 77 But the Ministry of the Interior, concerned more with civil disorder than civil liberties, objected
to this relatively progressive position of the Ministry of Justice. 78 As
a compromise, the Ministry of Justice eliminated any requirement
that the lawyer be present before declarations were made.7 9 Instead,
the proposed legislation left the possibility of a time period in which
discussions could be had with the suspect without the presence of a
lawyer, and in which maltreatment could conceivably occur.8 0
The government's proposed legislation won over even those sectors of the organized bar that had previously called for an absolute
ban on waiver of the right to counsel.81 Lawyers who had been critical of the government drew comfort and pride from their claims that
Spain would be alone among Western states in its provision for a
one is not so named, one will be appointed de oficio. Article 520.5 describes the assistance as
"required," but permits renunciation in minor cases.
76. See supra notes 44 and 49 and accompanying text.
77. El Pais, Dec. 26, 1982, at 13, col. 2. The Spanish term irrenunciabilidadis translated
as "unwaivable" in textual discussions in this article.
78. El Pais, Mar. 30, 1983, at 13, col. 1. While the proposals of the two Ministries were
being reconciled, Jose Maria Mohedano, President of the Association for Human Rights, held
a press conference in which he indicated that protest would be registered if the proposals were
unsatisfactory and did not contribute "to the eradication of the torture that continues in
Spain." El Pais, Mar. 24, 1983, at 16, col. 3. He described as "Machiavellian" a rumored
proposal which would have divided the initial period in which lawyers would not be present
but from which statements made by the defendant could not be used against him, and a subsequent period in which the lawyer would be present. The initial period would have facilitated
investigation without any risk to the defendant of self-incrimination. Id. at col. 5.
79. Report of Minister of Justice Ledesma Bartret to the Comision de Justicia e Interior,
Cortes Generales, DIARIO DE SESIONS DEL CONGRESO DE LOS DIPUTADOS [hereinafter D.
CONG.], No. 8, Feb. 11, 1983, at 8, col. 3.
80. This period could occur if the lawyer does not appear within eight hours of notification, since the authorities may then begin their examination if the detainee consents. As El
Pais noted, "the lack of immediacy leaves an interval of time that does not guarantee against
maltreatment of those detained .... " Las torturasy las asistencia letrada, El Pais, Apr. 1,
1983, at 6, col. 3.
81. In making the right to counsel unwaivable at the time of the formal declaration, the
government won the support of the organized Bar for its legislation; this eliminated much of
the organizational base of the opposition. El Pais, Mar. 30, 1983, at 13, col. 1; El Pais, Mar.
27, 1983, at 18, col. 1. This legislative proposal reflected a retreat from previous drafts by the
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which even surpassed

protection provided in the United States.
Because of the extraordinarily high waiver rate prior to the legislation, 4 and the situation in which a defendant released before seeing
a judge never met with an attorney, the Bar Association may have
believed that the benefits of the compromise solution of mandatory
lawyer participation outweighed the danger that police would outmaneuver the system by interrogating suspects before lawyers arrived
from the Colegio de Abogados The repeated claims that the right to
Ministry of Justice which had provided for the assistance of lawyers from the moment of
detention. El Pais, Dec. 26, 1982, at 13, col. 2.
Jose Mohedano was consulted shortly before announcement of the compromise legislation
and assessed the solution as "positive in its entirety." El Pais, Mar. 30, 1983, at 13, col. 1.
Speaking to the Congreso in the Cortes, Minister of Justice Ledesma Bartret proclaimed:
I think the most outstanding effect of this project is the surpassing of the objective character that the right to counsel has had until the present, enduring it with a
content that converts it to an authentic subjective public right; moreover, into a
juridical-procedural guarantee recognized in our Constitution and required as essential by our juridical order. And this is so... because the fundamental characteristic
of the subjective public rights ... is precisely irrenunciability; irrenunciability that
owes so much to the necessity to avoid unexpected pressures that impel the renunciation, as much as, and above all, that does not permit the possibility of renouncing
something considered as a right inherent to human dignity.
[T]he project makes the assistance of counsel an irrenouncable right, with that
they consecrated the right to search for and obtain justice, with full and efficacious
counsel, as an element consubstantial with the person and as a good socially assumed
and recognized in the legal order.
D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2820.
82. According to Ledesma Bartret, the proposed law was "one of the most advanced
existing in comparative law .... There are three countries in the Council of Europe that make
obligatory the presence of a lawyer in police investigations and only four in which the right to
counsel is unwaivable." D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2821, col. 1.
In fact, article 520 is very similar to the analogous provision in Italian law. The present
Code of Italian Criminal Procedure was amended in 1955 to provide that "the counsel for the
defendant had the right to be present at the various stages of the [fact-finding procedures],
such as confrontations .

. .,

expert testimony ....

searches ....

and lineups ....

Defense

counsel was also entitled to inspect and copy documents pertaining to the case, such as transcripts of the defendant's interrogation." M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 397 (1979). See also Judgment of July 5, 1968, Corte costituzionale,
Italy, 28 Rac. uff. corte cost. 77, 91 Foro It. I, 1681 (Amaducci et al.), where the Italian
Constitutional Court extended the protection of formal processes.
83. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 816 (1975) (condemning defendants to the right of
self-representation). In Italy as in Spain, the influence of the Warren Court made itself felt. In
praising the Amaducci decision, Professor Paolo Barile said that the Constitutional Court
"seems to draw on those modem and democratic elements of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States. The 'accusatory' system is in fact entering our practice; the rules
of 'due process' are being adapted by us in the sense of insuring a fair hearing to all ....
assuring the effectiveness of the right of defense." Barile, I diritti dell'imputatio, in
L'ESPRESSO, July 18, 1968, cited in M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, supra note 82, at 403.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
85. Presumably, narrow professional or economic consjderations did not influence the
decision to live with the government's compromise, though in the debates on the bill derisive
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counsel would be an expansive one provided further consolation to
the government's critics. In his presentation of proposed laws to the
Cortes in February 1983, Ledesma Bartret, the Minister of Justice,
declared that the lawyer would not be a "mere spectator" and that the
right to counsel would be "dynamic."86 The Minister's presentation
contemplated that the lawyer would participate in the initial processes
by insuring that the prisoner was aware that he did not have to implicate himself and that the police did not overlook facts that might
exculpate the suspect.8 7 In a subsequent presentation to the Senate,
the Minister called the law a significant advance with respect to the
right to counsel because under the existing statute, "the lawyer
'88
assisted passively" and contributed "practically nothing.
Yet, despite the government's assurances, the debates revealed
that widespread concerns about the fate of prisoners in the hands of
the police persisted. The transition from right-wing dictatorship to
socialist government was unable to exorcise the ghosts of repression.
As a brief recital of the major arguments will show, human rights are
not created ex nihilo; on the contrary, the implementation of broad
concepts of constitutional liberty frequently involves a lengthy and
arduous process of compromise and reconciliation. What makes the
Spanish experience uniquely instructive is that the process involved
open debate mandated by the Constitution itself. Unlike the constitutional experience in the United States, the final phase in the metamorphosis of the right to counsel in Spain was shaped not by lawyers and
judges, but by popularly elected representatives from a cross-section
of Spanish society.8 9
C.

CentralIssues in the Debate over the Right to Counsel

1. Immediate Legal Assistance
As adopted, article 520.4 provides that the authorities should not
make any recommendations about the selection of an attorney, but
should either communicate the name of the lawyer selected by the
detainee pursuant to his rights under article 520.2(c) to the Colegio de
allusion was made to the impact the amended code would have on jobs for lawyers. See supra
text accompanying note 71.
86. D. CONG., No. 8, Feb. 11, 1983, at 7, col. 1.
87. Id.
88. Cortes Generales, DIARIO DE SESIONES DEL SENADO [hereinafter D. SEN.], No. 36,
Nov. 22, 1983, at 1736, col. 2.
89. The Minister of Justice, Ledesma Bartret, said as much when he declared that the
governmental process which shaped the proposals reconciling the Code of Criminal Procedure
with the demands of the 1978 Constitution "pre-supposes the culmination of an enlarged political process." D. CONG., No. 60, Nov. 22, 1983, at 2821, col. 2.
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Abogados or request that a lawyer be designated de oficio in the event
none is named by the detainee. But unless the lawyer appears at the
place of detention within eight hours, the police may proceed with
their inquiries without the attorney's presence. When the attorney
does arrive, he has the right to review the proceedings and request
that additional questions be addressed to the detainee.
There was at first widespread sentiment in the Cortes that legal
assistance or presentment to a magistrate should be immediate. 90 But
this sentiment did not prevail over the government's proposal, which
was essentially to adopt the language of the Constitution which
requires that "in any case the person arrested must be set free or
handed over to the judicial authorities within a maximum period of
seventy-two hours." 9 1 The government argued that the detainee was

sufficiently protected by the intervention of the magistrate within seventy-two hours since the detainee is read his rights upon detention.9"
In the government's view, the presence of the lawyer would not significantly enhance the protection of the detainee against maltreatment.
More importantly, the government argued not only that "the
corresponding obligations of the judicial police" would be impeded by
any immediacy requirement for legal assistance, but also that the
detainee's civil rights could be prejudiced if the police had to wait for
a lawyer before they could clear a detainee through routine questioning. 93 A corollary of this argument was the suggestion that some
investigation should precede intervention by the lawyer, because the
requirement of delaying the investigation until the attorney's arrival
would mean summoning a lawyer to 94render legal assistance before
there is any apparent reason to do so.
The government's principal argument, though not entirely
responsive to the objections of the opposition, did carry great weight
in a society that up to the time of the debates-and indeed during
them-had been torn by alternating periods of suppression and disorder. Its argument was based on the security consideration that police
90. The Grupo Parliamentario Mixto (GPM) proposed language requiring that a
detainee "immediately be placed before a magistrate, but under no circumstances will deten-

tion exceed seventy-two hours." D. CONG., No. 60, Nov. 22, 1983, at 2836, col. 2. The Congreso eventually rejected the proposal by a vote of 21 in favor, 243 against and 7 abstentions.
D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2847, col. 2.
91. CONsT. art. 17.2.
92. See D. CONG., No. 60, Nov. 22, 1983, at 2845, col. 2, which reports the argument of
Socialist deputy Castellano Cardalliaguet, who drew a distinction between the right to legal
assistance and the exercise of the right and argued that article 17 of the Constitution is much
broader than the exercise of the right to counsel.
93. D. CONG., No. 50, June 30, 1983, at 1804, col. 2.
94. "[T]o say that the attorney will be notified immediately has no meaning; the attorney

must be notified for a reason." D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2841, col. 2.
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investigations should not be unnecessarily impeded by the need to
await the arrival of an attorney. This position is not without irony
since it emanated from the former opponents of a dictatorship which
had justified its rule largely by its ability to keep Spain pacified.
Socialist deputy Castellano Cardalliaguet discussed the interests of
the state:
In any case, it is obvious that every possibility must be
closed, with absolute respect to the profession of the lawyers, to resolute behavior of an obstructionist character,
through mere failure to appear, putting in danger what must
be the fulfillment on the part of the95 judicial police, of their
obligations with respect to society.
Opponents raised a wide range of objections to the government's
proposal to permit the police to interrogate the detainee eight hours
after the Colegio de Abogados was asked to assign an attorney.

Nearly all of the political parties (except the governing Socialist
party) opposed the government's position that the police should be
able to proceed without an attorney.9 6 But perhaps the most telling

argument was that of the Basques, one of whom explained their position in this way: unless the law required immediate assistance, "the
attorney would be simply a guest of stone" in the proceedings.9 7 A

similar argument has been made in numerous cases concerning the
right to counsel in the United States; 98 unless the attorney is present
95. D. CONG., No. 50, June 30, 1983, at 1804, col. 2.
96. Amendment 32, submitted by the Basques, proposed that the right to counsel be
afforded in all situations. Under their proposal, incommunicados would share the same privileges as ordinary criminals. Attention was drawn to article 17.3 of the Constitution which
"guaranteed the right of counsel to all who are detained ... according to the terms established
by law." In addition, article 53.1 of the Constitution provides that rights and liberties can be
regulated, but its essential context must be respected. The Basques argued that the right of
counsel has a dual purpose: to guarantee that a detainee is not coerced into an involuntary
confession and to ensure the immediate assistance of counsel. The justification for amendment
32 was that in the Socialist-drafted article 527.2, only the former is guaranteed, but not the
latter. In the end, the Socialists prevailed, so the law distinguishes between the rights of ordinary criminals and of "terrorists." Amendment 32 was defeated in Congress with only three
votes in favor of its adoption. Id. at 1813, col. 1.
97. D. SEN., No. 36, Nov. 22, 1983, at 1745, col. 2.
98. See, e.g., Esobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
57 (1932) (the period from arraignment to trial is "perhaps the most critical period of the
proceedings.. ." during which the accused requires "the aid of counsel.. ."). In Esobedo, the
Court declared:
In Gideon v. Wainwright,we held that every person accused of a crime, whether state
or federal, is entitled to a lawyer at trial .... [But the) "right to use counsel at the
formal trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial examination." "One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let them have the most illustrious counsel, now. They can't escape the
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from the inception of police interrogatiol, the decisive trial will happen before lawyers and court officials are present, and all that happens

subsequently will only serve to confirm what the police have already
achieved. Put another way, if the police can interrogate the detainee
and proceed without the lawyer's presence, there is little point in having the lawyer present after an uncounseled defendant has already

convicted himself before the police.
There were still other objections. Aguilera Bermudez of the
Grupo Popular argued that permitting the police to proceed after the
eight-hour period would undercut the right to counsel, since the law
did not provide for appointment of a second lawyer if the first did not
appear. 99 In essence, a waiver which the detainee could not himself
effect would be accomplished by the mere passage of time. Attempting to steer a middle course between the advocates of immediacy and
the government, the Grupo Popular argued that if the attorney did
not arrive within the prescribed time period, the suspect should be

placed before a magistrate before interrogation could continue. 10
Given the huge Socialist majority in Parliament, it was no surprise that the view of the government prevailed.10 The compromise
between the Ministries of Justice and the Interior resulted in a resolution that plainly tilted toward security. Under the final compromise,
situations could arise in which the lawyer would arrive after the
detainee has already "convicted" himself; in such circumstances, the
lawyer would be capable of doing little more than ratifying a fait
accompli.

Despite the Socialist government's success in establishing the
noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial.'" (citations
omitted).
378 U.S. at 487, 488. See also Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1298 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
99. The Grupo Popular's amendment 12 read: "If eight hours have transpired from the
time the Colegio de Abogados was contacted, and the lawyer unjustifiably does not appear at
the place the detainee finds himself, such shall be communicated to the judicial authority,
which for a period of eight hours and in agreement with the Colegio de Abogados will provide
de oficio assistance to the detainee." D. SEN., No. 36, Nov. 22, 1983, at 1751, col. 1. The
Grupo Popular's amendment was rejected by a vote of 48 to 113 with 2 abstentions. Id. at
1716, col. 2.

100. Id.
101. D. CONG., No. 50, June 3, 1983, at 1811, col. 1. The Grupo Popular's amendment
received considerable support from the Socialists, although not nearly enough to carry it. The
amendment was rejected by the Senate by a vote count of 48 in favor, 113 against and 2
abstentions. Speaking for the Socialists, Remis Rebassa stated in the Senate hearings: "[I]
would very much have preferred never to have had to offer this article in the first place, and
would have preferred that the sociological situation in this nation had permitted its omission,
but, that not being the case, my group, at least, is going to firmly support its legal enactment."
D. SEN., No. 37, Nov. 23, 1983, at 1764, col. 2.
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eight-hour time limit, opposition parties were successful in providing
some relief from the tyranny of the clock. The Grupo Popular succeeded in including a provision that limits the commencement of
police interrogation after eight hours to situations in which the lawyer's failure to appear within the prescribed time is unjustified.10 2 The
wording of article 520.4 on this point is not unambiguous, however.
It declares that the police will be able to examine the suspect "if the
lawyer unjustifiably does not appear at the place where the detainee or
prisoner can be found." Article 520.4 also seems to provide for some
additional delay in situations where the lawyer might have to travel
from places like Madrid or Barcelona to more isolated districts where
lawyers may be difficult to locate. The government, anxious to ensure
that the police did not lose the right to examine the suspect because
the lawyer did not appear, was willing to accept language allowing the
possibility of some delay in special circumstances, so long as it did not
undercut the right of the police to examine the suspect eventually.
Another major argument of the opposition to the government's
proposal was that allowing the police to delay notification of the
Colegio de Abogados for eight hours before the seventy-two hour time
limit for presentation before a magistrate started running not only
effectively isolates the detainee from legal assistance, but also allows
the police to wear down his capacity to resist-at least psychologically, if not physically as well. 10 3 On this score, a few sentences of
Francoist history are worth a volume of logical explanation. The
Spanish left has historically mistrusted the police, and after the experience of the dictatorship, the left viewed no prophylactic measure as
excessive or ill-advised. Ironically, however, the accession to power
of the Socialists caused them to be confronted for the first time with
the responsibility for controlling increasing crime and avoiding fragmentation of the social order through political violence. Disorder and
irridentism had in effect made the Socialists legatees of Francoist concerns about law and order. The compromise between the Ministries
of Justice and the Interior resulted in the imposition of a process in
which the practical needs of law enforcement prevailed over the
Socialists' historical antipathy for both the ordinary police and the
Guardia Civil. 10 4
102. D. SEN., No. 42b (Serie H: Textos Legislativos), Oct. 27, 1983, at 10, col. 1, reproduces amendment 12, which was incorporated and passed as the second paragraph of Article
520.4.
103. Bandres Molet made this argument in the Congreso debates. See D. CONG., No. 60,
Sept. 29, 1983, at 2824, col. 2.
104. The Guardia Civil, now a 58,000-person paramilitary national police force, became
the embodiment of Francoist rule. To this day they guard important installations in Madrid
and elsewhere with automatic weapons at the ready.
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The Lawyer's Function in the Initial Investigation

Article 520.6 charges the attorney with the responsibility for: (1)
informing the detainee of his rights, including his privilege not to give
evidence against himself; (2) arranging a medical examination of the
detainee; (3) clarifying any declarations or identifications previously
made by the detainee; (4) interviewing the detainee in a "reserved"
manner; and (5) ensuring that the detainee is either released or taken
to a magistrate within seventy-two hours of arrest. 1 5 Clearly, the
overarching controversy was about how active the intervention by
lawyers should be. This difference in opinion manifested itself in
attempts to amend the legislation.
Subsection 6(a) of article 520 provides that the attorney should
inform the detainee of his rights as set out in subsection 2. The government argued that this prophylactic routine would give the defendant protection against police overreaching. It was thought that an
informed defendant could not be coerced, especially if his lawyer was
present as an observer. To the Socialist government, the lawyer
served as the principal protector of the rights of the defendant. As
Perez Solano, who spoke for the government before the Congress,
suggested: "The presence and activity of an attorney who assists [the
arrested individual] at the moment of detention should exercise the
law in such a manner as to assure the fulfillment of the detainee's
rights, and if there is an irregularity, the attorney is obligated to note
10 6
such incidents in the transcript."'
The Grupo Parliamentario Mixto (GPM), a coalition group in
the Cortes composed mainly of regional interests, attempted to
expand the attorney's role beyond that proposed by the government.
Its proposal provided for a private interview with the client without a
time limitation. The GPM also suggested that it be made clear that
the lawyer could participate in the interrogation, counseling the
accused as to which questions should or should not be answered.
Indeed, the GPM argued that the attorney should be able to actively
intervene in all legal processes on behalf of the detainee. 0 7 Relying
105. L.E. CRIM. art. 520.6.
106. D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2830, col 2.
107. Amendment 36, as proposed by the GPM, would have required that the attorney
insist that the detainee be informed of his rights and that he receive a medical examination;
that the attorney and detainee be afforded a private and personal interview as may be necessary, whether or not the detainee has made a declaration; that the lawyer be capable of representing the detainee in all interrogations; that he be able to cross-examine the witness in
investigations; and that the attorney shall be granted all rights under other laws and regula-

tions of the bar. D. CONG., No. 50, June 30, 1983, at 1809, col. 1.
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upon the U.S. experience, Bandres Molet, GPM spokesperson before
the Constitutional Commission, declared:
I believe that the Socialist party and those who vote
[for the government proposal] will have great difficulty in
explaining to the suffering Spanish television viewer why the
Spanish justice system is inferior to that of the American
justice system .... We will have to explain to the voter and
to justify in the future, that besides more dollars, more
petroleum, more information, more machines, [the Americans] have better justice than ours."0 8
The government, however, addressed a more fundamental concern among the Spanish, namely, the specter of physical abuse, a fear
which also pervaded the attempts by the opposition to clarify the

right to medical examination. 0

9

In the view of the Socialists, the reci-

108. Id.
109. Indirectly related to the right of counsel was the right to have a medical doctor
examine the arrested person before and after his release. The medical doctor, much like the
attorney, was to assume the role of an observer, assuring that the detained person was not
physically abused or under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
The right to request a medical examination was enacted as subsections 2(f) and 6(c) of
article 520. Under subsection 2(f), a detained person has the right to an examination by a
medical doctor or his legal equivalent at the place of custody. Where the detainee cannot
secure the services of his own physician, an examination may be performed by a publicly-paid
physician. Subsection 6(a) provides that an attorney may request that the defendant be
examined.
The Basques were instrumental in ensuring that the right to a medical examination was
absolute and would not prejudice the detainee. The Basques and Communists attempted to
clarify these two issues by amendment. The proposed amendments were directed at two issues:
when the examination could be requested and whether the person in custody could request a
medical doctor of his choice. The Communists proposed that the person detained should have
a right to be examined by a medical doctor at the moment of arrest or detention as well as
when released. The main thrust of this amendment, the Communists argued, was to assure
that the person was not under the influence of drugs, medication or alcohol during detention.
Should the person be found in such a state, interrogations and any identification proceedings
would have to cease, since a person under such conditions might not comprehend his rights.
The Communists also proposed that the attorney conferring with the detainee should have the
right to summon a physician if he believed the detainee was, in medical terms, unable to proceed with the formal declaration or the identification process. If this request was denied by
police bent on proceeding, a record would be made of the request and denial. The Communist
Party's amendment never passed the Congress.
The Socialist party preferred Basque amendment 23, which was partly adopted. The
Basques were more concerned with the process by which the doctor was selected. They proposed that the person under custody or detention have the right to be examined by a medical
doctor of his choice. Should the doctor designated by the detainee not be available, then and
only then would the detainee be limited to the right to be examined by a public or institutional
doctor. The Basques convinced the Cortes to accept this proposal by arguing that personal
medical doctors are better qualified to attest to the possible drug effects caused by medication
that they themselves have prescribed. The examination by a personal medical doctor would
also assure that no declarations were taken of drugged or medicated detainees.
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tation of rights in the government proposal provided sufficient assurance that the defendant would not involuntarily answer questions and
legally precluded any prejudgment as to guilt because of failure to
respond. The Socialists also felt that if the mere presence of the lawyer was not sufficient to discourage physical abuse, active participation by attorneys would provide no greater protection against law
enforcement authorities bent on inflicting torture on detainees.
In an unsuccessful defense of the GPM's proposals, Bandres
Molet argued that the lawyer should be able both to counsel the
defendant not to answer certain questions and to actually participate
in the interrogation by interjecting questions which might be more
favorable to the accused. 110 In the legislation eventually adopted,
however, the lawyer's presence is required only at the formal declaration, and his ability to actively participate during the proceedings is
circumscribed.
3.

The Mandatory Right to Counsel

By making the right to counsel mandatory, the government was
able to suggest that it strongly supported human rights, and thereby
gain the support of the organized bar, traditionally a strong source of
opposition to police power. As suggested earlier, 1 waiver of counsel
by intimidated prisoners upon presentation before the magistrate had
been a serious problem that adversely impacted both the civil liberties
of those arrested, and, not unimportantly, the practice of law. By
championing the prescriptive right to counsel, the government was
able to shift attention from the vital role of the lawyer during the
interrogation process to his largely ceremonial function before the
magistrate.
The government's position was captured in Ledesma Bartret's
opening statements to the Congress in September 1983. He declared:
"[T]he fundamental characteristic of the right [to counsel] . ..is its
unwaivability. The unwaivability exists to avoid the pressures which
impel waiver, but above all, not to permit the possibility of renouncing something considered inherent to human dignity."' 1 2 Put in such
a theoretical and lofty way, there was little counter-argument from
the opposition, which was left to struggle over whether the right to
counsel-meaningful or not-would extend to minor offenses such as
traffic violations.
110. D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2825, col. 2. The GPM proposal also provided
for the recording and retention of any observations the lawyer had about the initial inquiry.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 49-56.

112. D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2820, col. 1.
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Here, opposition efforts to extend the legislation were not only
unavailing, but were actually greeted somewhat derisively by the government, which suggested that the proponents of a right to counsel
without exception might in fact be advocating special-interest legislation. Ramis Rebassa, spokesperson for the Socialist Party in the Senate, stated: "[I] am absolutely convinced that all attorneys in Spain,
especially those who have recently graduated from law school, would
support the Grupo Popular's proposal [to extend the right to counsel]
because it will be the only means, in these times of severe inflation, to
assure that they will be employed." '1 13 On another occasion, Castellano Cardalliaguet argued against an absolute right to counsel in all
cases regardless of the severity of the offense, on the ground that it
would unduly burden the judicial system and might lead to the institutionalization of attorneys in every facet of Spanish legal practice.
Such a right, he argued, could' create a "new figure known as the permanent attorney companion. 114
Despite the sarcasm and veiled derision with which the Socialists
greeted attempts to extend the right to counsel to all offenses, there
were significant attempts to delete the traffic offense exception. Bandres Molet of the Grupo Parliamentario Mixto expressed worry about
the tendency of the police to rely on confessions to resolve crimes:
[U]nfortunately, the police.., are not sufficiently scientific
and prefer confessions because with them their mission is
completed. The confession will continue to be sought
through incommunicado processes or whatever and if the
attorney is not present at the time and moment in which one
is needed, the day will come when we will view on television
people confessing to murdering who knows whom.' 15
Bandres Molet also suggested that, aside from the impact that such
traffic offense procedures might have on police practices generally, the
practical effect of such procedures would be to permit special police
forces, especially the Guardia Civil, to use statements obtained during
traffic arrests as evidence upon which to obtain criminal convictions.
He argued that it was not uncommon for testimony obtained by the
113. D. SEN., No. 37, Nov. 23, 1983, at 1766, col.'1. Amendment 14, proposed by the
Grupo Parliamentario Popular, would have guaranteed all persons charged with a crime the
right to an attorney during arraignment. In addition, the attorney, again acting more as an
observer than an adversary, could make a declaration on behalf of the detainee recording any
wrongdoing or abuse of power by the police authorities during the interrogation proceedings.
The Amendment was rejected by a vote of 37 in favor and 111 against. D. SEN., No. 37, Nov.
23, 1983, at 1767, col. 1.
114. D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2828, col. 1.
115. Id. at col. 2.
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Guardia Civil in traffic matters to be the principal evidence at the
time of the verdict in a 1later
criminal trial because of the excessive
6
workload of the courts.'
The attempts to expand the right to counsel to cover all offenses,
no matter how inconsequential on the surface, were based on a mixture of serious theoretical and practical objections. At the theoretical
level, the opposition was concerned about the precedential effect that
permitting the police to operate without a guarantee of counsel for the
detainee would inevitably have on procedures governing more serious
offenses. Many feared that it would not be possible to compartmentalize exceptions to the right to counsel. At the practical level, the
opposition regarded the minor offense category as a significant area in
which police abuse might still adversely impact civil liberties.
On the question of policing the police, the Socialists argued that
the provision requiring that detainees be advised of their rights, which
was applicable to serious as well as trivial offenses, sufficed to protect
those arrested from self-incrimination, and enabled them to request a
lawyer, be examined medically, and contact family members." 7
Moreover, the Socialists argued, the prisoner's capacity to resist
police pressure was buttressed by the sanctions of the penal code. In
Castellano Cardalliaguet's words: "If the police commit an offense,
let the weight of the law fall upon them."'1 8 In effect, therefore, the
Socialists asked the opposition to let the system work in its entirety,
and not to overload the right to counsel provision, which, in any case,
could not alone guarantee the protection of human rights.
The Spanish security forces might be said to have won a significant victory in the debates, and from an unexpected quarter. 1 9 The
police were given the power to question suspects, and defendants
could not completely forestall this power by demanding an attorney.
The police were placed in a position where in practical terms they
could sew up the case before the lawyer entered. In effect, the lawyer's role was reduced to that of an observer rather than an effective
intermediary. In the end, the lawyer's only indispensable function
was to attend the courtroom ceremony after the case had been "con116. D. CONG., No. 50, June 30, 1983 at 1790, col. 2. Bandres Molet was particularly
concerned about the Guardia Civil which, because of its paramilitary status, was permitted to
conduct routine road inspections without a search warrant, and could use any evidence
obtained in such searches against the detainee. Furthermore, the Guardia Civil could at any
time stop and question an automobile driver without probable cause.
117. D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2827, col. 2.

118. Id. at 2829, col. 2.
119. On the irony of Socialist identification with the imperatives of security, see supra
text accompanying note 104; Inocentes, pero menos, El Pais, Oct. 5, 1983, at 10, col. 3.
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cluded" at the police station.1 20
4.

Incommunicados and the Right to Counsel

Despite the attention given to the prosecution of ordinary
offenses, there was greater concern in Spain regarding the treatment
of incommunicados, largely those accused of terrorist or political
offenses. Incommunicados are prisoners who are insulated from contact with persons who are not detained, thus restricting the capacity
of the prisoner to further cooperate with co-conspirators. 121 Since
there is no real analogue to this Spanish practice in the criminal justice system of the United States,1 22 and since this article and the
research upon which it is predicated concentrate on procedures
120. Cf.Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure,in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 19 (A.
Howard ed. 1965) (parallel description of lawyers' role in U.S. legal system).
121. See article III, Organic Law of 1980, section 17 et seq. for the incommunicado law.
See also L.E. CRIM. art. 506 et seq.
122. But see the recurrent clamoring for preventive detention, which peaked during the
Nixon era. 116 CONG. REc. 16,884, 16,885-88 (May 25, 1970) (statement of Sen. Ervin, in
opposition to S.2600 (Dept. of Justice preventive detention proposal)); Mitchell, Bail Reform
and the Constitutionality of PretrialDetention, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969). Recently, the
Supreme Court upheld the New York practice of detaining juveniles to prevent them from
committing additional offenses. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). Last term, the Court
handed down its decision in United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987), affirming the
constitutionality of the federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1982), which
authorizes pretrial detention on the basis of future dangerousness.
In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Supreme Court came one step closer to
the Spanish perspective by recognizing a public safety exception to the Miranda requirements.
In Quarles, a woman claimed to have been raped by an armed assailant, and stated that she
had last seen the man enter a nearby supermarket. Two police officers entered the market, and
when the suspect (Quarles) fled, they gave chase. Upon apprehending Quarles, the police
frisked him, found an empty shoulder holster, and asked him where the gun was. Quarles told
the police where the gun was, and the police then formally arrested him and advised him of his
Miranda rights.
The New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize an emergency exception to the
Mirandarequirements, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that in this case
there was a public safety exception to the Miranda requirements and that the gun was admissible evidence. 467 U.S. at 655-56. The majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, emphasized the needs of police in "special" situations. While agreeing with the New York Court of
Appeals that Quarles was in custody for Miranda purposes, the Court rejected any presumption that Quarles' statements were coerced. Id. at 654. Instead, the Court held that in a
"kaleidoscopic situation" such as this one, public safety concerns justified not requiring
Miranda warnings. Id. at 656.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion declared that the potential dangers resulting from a dangerous weapon concealed in a public area outweighed the necessity of protecting a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights. Id. at 657. Quarles may severely reduce the deterrent effect of Miranda
and encourage the development of police procedures similar to the Spanish treatment of
incommunicados. By holding that the motives of the police officers involved were irrelevant to
the exception, the Court invited ex post facto justification of future violations of suspects'
rights. If, under the Quarles standard, a single unarmed suspect, handcuffed and surrounded
by police officers, presents a sufficient threat to public safety because of a handgun concealed
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employed in connection with "common crimes," the Spanish treatment of terrorists, though of decisive significance in Spain, 123 will be
analysed only
insofar as it illuminates the general detention
124
legislation.

According to the Spanish government, incommunicado status
constitutes the principal legal engine in the fight to suppress terror-

ism. The powerful forces of separatism compel each government of
Spain to confront the ineluctable reality that there is not one Spain,
but several. 125 Efforts to increase autonomy from Madrid range from
distributing leaflets to murdering government officials and their sympathizers. Despite the reality of separatist conflict and strong opposition from the representatives of political groups such as the Basques,
and despite its arguable conflict with the seemingly unqualified sweep
of the Constitution's language about a right to counsel, article 527
126
was nevertheless enacted.
nearby, then most terrorist situations will surely fall under the same exception to the rule of
Miranda.
123. In Spain, of course, the question of treatment of captured terrorists and other prisoners from the potential breakaway provinces in the Basque country and in Catalonia is an
important issue. Terrorism in Spain has its roots in the guerilla warfare which sprang from the
Francoist victory in the Civil War. In the 1960s, a new form of terrorism sprang up, particularly in the Basque provinces, Galicia, and Cataluiia. The catalyst for these movements was
Franco's repression of regional minorities, whose cultural expression and languages were
strictly forbidden. While most Spaniards believed that terrorism would disappear with the
coming of democracy, the reverse proved to be the case, as ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom) and the lesser terrorist organizations sought to destabilize the parliamentary regime in its
infancy. Even after the issuance of a political amnesty decree on October 15, 1977 and the
granting of regional autonomy, the killings continued. The feeling of horror and impotence in
the face of mounting attacks played a great part in the adoption of stringent anti-terrorism
legislation in a desperate attempt to deal with the problem.
In the minority provinces, especially in the Basque country, the questions of political
liberty, independence, and law enforcement are so inextricably interwoven that it is impossible
to do justice to the complexity of the controversy in this article. For example, although ETA
efforts to overthrow the dominance of Madrid are extremist, the desire for independence or
autonomy is shared by many Basques. Indeed, the passage of the Constitution itself was
delayed in part because of Basque opposition. The Basques wanted responsibility for maintaining local law and order to be vested in the autonomous Basque government, which already had
an embryonic police force. The Spanish army and police officials rejected the idea of allowing
regional authorities to control security and public order; as they saw it, the tightly centralized
police system that democratic Spain had inherited from Franco was an invaluable asset. See
L.A. Times, Oct. 8, 1978, § 1, at 18, col. 3.
124. It should be noted, however, that growing concerns about acts of terrorism directed
against Americans abroad and scattered acts of terrorism within the United States have
prompted suggestions that it is necessary to enact laws dealing with such terrorism.
125. The provinces of Galicia, Catalonia, Viscaya, Balencia and Mallorca all have their
own languages and culture, and the degree of political integration with Central and Southern
Spain varies markedly from one province to the next.
126. L.E. CRIM. art. 527, text supra at note 73 (denying incommunicados the right of
communication with their attorneys provided in art. 520). See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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Under current law, prisoners may be held incommunicado for up
to ten days and do not enjoy any of the rights granted under article
520, with the exception of some qualified rights guaranteed by subsection 2. An incommunicado cannot: (1) retain his own counsel
(though counsel is assigned to him); (2) communicate with third persons under article 520.2(d); or (3) speak with his own attorney, as
otherwise permitted by article 520.6(c).1 27 Debate concerning article
527 focused on the detainee's right to select his attorney; the status of
the incommunicado seemed to be accepted without argument. The
Basques argued that resolution of the conflict between the general
presumption of innocence in criminal cases and the incommunicado's
"presumption of culpability" required granting an individual held
incommunicado the same rights and privileges granted to any other
detainee under article 520.128 While a de oficio attorney is capable of

assuring that the defendant is not coerced or forced to make a formal
declaration, the Basques argued that the appointment of such an
attorney in many cases nevertheless would preclude an individual

from getting the best representation possible. 129

The Basque representative before Congress, Echeberria
Monteberria, stated that the right to counsel has a dual purpose: to
prevent the coercion of a formal declaration against the prisoner's
will, and to assure that the prisoner gets the best representation and
127. L.E. CRIM. art. 527, text supra at note 73. Except for the added provisions concerning appointment of a de oficio attorney and the right to an interview with the lawyer, the
current version of article 527 generally follows the language of the statute passed in 1978. The
revised article 527 is the most recent contribution to the body of anti-terrorist legislation that
extends back to a decree for the prevention of terrorism of August 26, 1975. Royal decree 21
of June 30, 1978, which outlined measures to deal with crimes of armed bands, and which was
enacted into law on July 4, 1978, vested jurisdiction over terrorist offenses in the Audencia
Nacional, the highest court with jurisdiction over criminal cases, sitting in Madrid. On
December 4, 1978, another law was passed to deal with armed bands. Though its duration was
limited to one year, it was extended until superseded by legislation known as the Antiterrorist
Law of December 1, 1980.
Royal decree 3 of January 26, 1979 was perhaps the most comprehensive of the antiterrorist laws. Governing the "protection of civic safety" (proteccidn de Seguridad Ciudana),
the decree established a series of exceptional procedural norms, applicable not only to crimes
of terrorism but also to all forms of robbery and picketing at unlawful strikes. In some of the
provinces, however, prosecutors were reluctant to avail themselves of the law where the crime
was not in fact terrorist in origin. Most importantly, the law permitted the magistrates to
impose provisional or temporary detainment and incommunicado status even for minor
offenses if they had been committed for terrorist purposes. The decree was regulated procedurally by articles 502-19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which concern temporary
imprisonment, and articles 520-27, which govern the right to counsel, the subject of this
article.
128. D. CONG., No. 50, June 30, 1983, at 1810, col. 2.
129. Id.
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advice possible. 130 The appointment of a de oficio attorney guarantees
the former goal, but not the latter, given that fulfillment of the latter
requires that the lawyer have knowledge of the detained person's situation and that the detainee have confidence in the attorney's ability
and sincerity; these elements are likely to be lacking where the state
appoints a de oficio attorney for the detainee. 13 ' The Basques suggested that a person who is suspected of committing a crime against
the state should receive more, rather than less, protection of his
rights, since he is effectively treated as guilty rather than presumed
innocent upon detention. Greater protection, it was argued, could
only be achieved by selecting an attorney already known to the
1 32
detainee or allowing the detainee to select his own attorney.
Finally, the Basques were concerned about when the Colegio de
Abogados would be contacted and at what stage incommunicados
would have the right to an attorney. The Grupo Parliamentario
Mixto argued that the right to counsel presupposed an immediate
communication to the Colegio de Abogados. Its spokesman Bandres
Molet commented that, whatever the time limit, the Colegio de Abogados was likely to be notified only five or six hours before the incom33
municado period expired. 1
The Socialists offered several justifications for their version of
article 527. 134 Initially, the Socialists argued that incommunicado status was needed to assure national security. Responding to charges
that incommunicado status facilitated abuse by the police forces of
their security responsibilities, the Socialists argued that four elements
assured that the Constitution would not be violated. First, the law
does not permit the imposition of incommunicado status until the
detainee appears before a magistrate who must weigh the sufficiency
and probative value of the evidence presented against the defendant:
"it is the judge who decrees the incommunication" and it is "the
judge who fixes the limits of the incommunication."' 135 Second, once
the judge has rendered an individual an incommunicado, an attorney,
albeit de oficio, is appointed to be present during formal declarations.
"The incommunicado enjoys at all times the assistance of an attorney," it was argued in the Senate. 136 In the Congress, it was also
noted that the de oficio attorney is not selected by the police but by
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra note 96.
D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2838, col. 2.
Id.
Id. at 2824, col. 2.
Id. at 1811, col. 1. See also supra note 101.
D. CONG., No. 50, June 30, 1983, at 1811, col. 1. See L.E. CRIM. art. 502 et seq.
D. SEN., No. 36, Nov. 22, 1983, at 1757, col. 1.
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the Colegio de Abogados, an institution without links to the security
forces.137 Third, a medical doctor can "visit the detained person
every time he is requested to do so."' 3 8 The physician thus reinforces
one of the roles of the lawyer whose presence assures-in the government's view-that the detainee will not be abused or tortured.
Fourth, the Socialists argued, incommunicado status was already
established in Spanish law and was therefore not an invention of the
present regime. 13 9
Secondarily, the Socialists also contended that the reading of a
person's rights under article 520.2 was in itself an assurance that
rights would not be violated, especially since a detained person had a
right to remain silent and not to incriminate himself. 40 Left unanswered, however, was the criticism that this was essentially an evasion, because it gave the police forces the opportunity to justify any
coerced statements by merely arguing that the defendant had "voluntarily" communicated such statements.
The opposition stressed the potential for abuse under articles
520.2(a) and 527, the probable unconstitutionality of the entire
"incommunicado" concept, and the violation of international treaties
on human rights.14 ' Before the Congress, Perez Rojo, speaking for
the Grupo Parliamentario Mixto, expressed the view that international human rights organizations have accepted the right of those
charged as terrorists to be interviewed by an attorney of his or her
choice. He declared:
[T]he contents of this norm should be interpreted in conformance with Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution in
light of international treaties and Article 14.3(b) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
[which] recognize the right of communication with an attorney of one's own election, an expression which repeats itself
in Article 14.3(d) of the above mentioned Article and is
articulated in Article 6.3(c) of the European Convention for
the Protection of Fundamental Liberties and Human
142
Rights.
137. D. CONG., No. 50, June 30, 1983, at 1812, col. 2.

138. D. SEN., No. 36, Nov. 22, 1983, at 1757, col. 1.
139. Cf.D. SEN., No. 37, Nov. 23, 1983, at 1767, col. 1.
140. D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2820, col. 1.
141.

Portabella I. Rafols, speaking on behalf of the GPM, argued that a detainee, denied

the right to an interview with his attorney as permitted for those charged with ordinary crimes,
was vulnerable to abuse under articles 520.6(c) and 527. D. SEN., No. 37, Nov. 23, 1983, at
1765, col. 2.

142. D. CONG., No. 60, Sept. 29, 1983, at 2839, col. 2.
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Perez Rojo concluded that nothing would be lost if the detained person is allowed an interview with his attorney immediately upon detention and is then taken to a formal declaration. Perez Rojo believed
that by permitting a detainee to select his own attorney, greater pressure would be placed on the detainee to make a formal declaration as
soon as possible. 143 The GPM also expressed the view that article 527
does not conform with article 55.1 of the Spanish Constitution, which
guarantees to all citizens certain fundamental rights, which cannot be
suspended except in "un estado de excepcidn o de sitio" (a state of
emergency or martial law).144
It is difficult to explain adequately the intensity of the debate
over the incommunicado issue in an article devoted to defense of prisoners charged with ordinary violations of the Criminal Code. The
value of this discussion may lie in what it suggests about how the right
to counsel was viewed apart from its relevance to terrorism. It is a
testament to the faith of Spaniards in the institutions of liberal democracy that they believe the interposition of lawyers would make a difference in the highly charged and volatile political situation of the
incommunicados. Arguably, the debate involved more than an
attempt at obstructing or embarrassing the will of the dominant political party. Just as plausibly, it reflects a widespread movement in
Spain to liberalize the institutions of social and political control.
In a sense, much of the debate involved opposing sides talking
past each other. The opposition wanted a guarantee that would dispel
the ghosts of the Francoist past. The government argued that the new
democratic order provided sufficient assurance that human rights
would be protected-a proposition impossible to disprove except by
future events. Throughout the debates, the government said "trust
me," while the opposition said "show me." The government believed
that independent institutions like the Colegio de Abogados could be
entrusted with the responsibility of appointing lawyers for the incommunicados. Indeed, in the government's view, permitting the Colegio
de Abogados to assign a lawyer was itself a progressive stance on the
right to counsel for incommunicados, since article 17.3, strictly read,
does not require that the lawyer be elected by the accused, but only
provides generally for the assistance of counsel. But to the opposition
this was a regressive position because, in its view, the right of the
accused to name and confer with his lawyer was an inherent aspect of
the right to counsel. Of greatest importance to the opposition was the
defendant's right to name a lawyer who would represent him from the
143. Id. at 2845, col. 1.
144. Id. at 2839, col. 2.
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initial contact at the police station through trial and any appeal. The
opposition disparaged the "double figure of an initial lawyer, notary,
[a] mute witness.., and then later the lawyer who is defender."' 4 5
The government's ultimate rejoinder was the strength of its
sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections preceding the debate.
On the question of internal security-the issue overshadowing the
debate on the incommunicados-the government swept aside all proposals to modify its legislation, and article 527 was enacted as
submitted.
IV.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS A FUNDAMENTAL NORM IN
SPANISH JUDICIAL REVIEW: UN R UMBO MAS
PROGRESIVO?146

While the Spanish Parliament debated the scope of the right to
counsel, the judiciary affirmed the constitutional principle of assistance of counsel as a fundamental norm, thereby invalidating convictions in which defendants had not been represented by counsel. The
discussion thus far has emphasized the legislative process and constitutional development. But the rise of judicial review in Spain-the
growth of constitutionalism-is an important development of nearly

equal significance, and one which suggests a more liberal and progressive route toward protecting the rights of the accused.' 4 7
Given the importance of parliamentary supremacy in continental

145. This exchange between the spokesman for the government and the leader of the
GPM is reported in D. CONG., No. 50, June 30, 1983, at 1813, col. 1. See also id. at 1819, col.
2.
146. Un rumbo mds progresivo might be translated as "a more progressive way" or "a
more progressive route."
147. With this more progressive policy, Spain thus joins the post-war constitutionalist
movements eloquently discussed by Professor Mauro Cappelletti. See Cappelletti, The Significance of JudicialReview of Legislation in the Contemporary World, in 1 Ius PRIVATUM GENTIUM 147 (1969). Elsewhere, Professor Cappelletti has written:
One of the essential legal developments of our time is, for a growing number of civil
law countries, the introduction of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. Although this institution has ancient historical precedents, the matrix of its
modern growth may certainly be seen, in part, in the American model. Developments in this field are cutting across the boundaries of legal families ....
Judicial review of legislation, a rarely encountered insititution until recent times,
has been introduced in the last few decades in various countries throughout the
world. Since the last World War, the growth of this institution has experienced what
could well be called a worldwide explosion. It almost appears as if no Western, or
even Eastern, country purporting to be a modern democracy, can resist the temptation to adopt some form of control-judicial or otherwise-of the constitutionality of
legislation. The phenomenon, of course, is particularly interesting where the power
of control is entrusted to a judicial body, with the emergence of an interplay between
two different and independent powers.
M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, supra note 82, at 12-15.
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theory and practice, 148 recent applications of the constitutional right

to counsel by a judiciary not historically renowned for its independence serve to legitimate the proposition that a democratic order
requires fundamental equality between the state and the accused in
the criminal justice process, and that assistance of counsel is critical
to the equation. 149 The Spanish cases suggest that while the work of

the Cortes was both important and constitutionally required, criminal
convictions might be pervasively subject to judicial invalidation if

defendants are denied legal assistance.

148. See J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed. 1985); compare Barker,
ConstitutionalAdjudicationin Costa Rica: A Latin American Model, 17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REv. 249, 250-52 (1986) (little judicial control over the other branches of government in the
traditional continental systems).
149. Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932),
remains among the most trenchant statements of the necessity for counsel in criminal cases
prosecuted in a democratic order which values human rights:
It has never been doubted by this court, or any other so far as we know, that
notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforceable
judgment, and that they, together with a legally competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirements of due
process of law ....
What, then, does a hearing include? Historically and in practice, in our own
country at least, it has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired
and provided by the party asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a
state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed
by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal
would be denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional
sense.
The impact of the American constitutional tradition upon contemporary Spain can be
seen in the importance Spanish scholars attach to developments in the United States. A leading Spanish commentator has written: "The technique of attributing to the Constitution a
superior normative value, immune to ordinary laws and determining their validity, its superior
judicial protection, is the most important creation, along with the federal system, of North
American constitutionalism and its great innovation from the English tradition from which it
emerged."

E. GARCIA DE ENTERRIA, LA CONSTITUCION CoMo NORMA Y EL TRIBUNAL

CONSTITUCIONAL [THE CONSTITUTION AS NORM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL] 51

(1981).
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Constitutional Court Powers

Before commencing a discussion of the cases, some consideration
of the power of the Constitutional Court and its position relative to
the Cortes is warranted. The Constitution of 1978 explicitly makes
the Constitutional Court supreme in matters of constitutional interpretation. The critical articles of the Constitution are 161, 163 and
164, which are set out in relevant part below:
Article 161
1. The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over the
whole of Spanish territory and is competent to hear:
a) Appeals against the alleged unconstitutionality of
laws and regulations having the force of law. A declaration
of unconstitutionality of a legal provision with the force of
law, interpreted by jurisprudence shall also affect the latter,
although the sentence or sentences handed down shall not
lose their status or resjudicata.
Article 163
If a judicial body considers, in some action, that a regulation with the status of law which is applicable thereto and
upon the validity of which the judgment depends, may be
contrary to the Constitution, it may bring the matter before
the Constitutional Court in the circumstances, manner and
subject to the consequences to be laid down by law, which
shall in no case be suspensive.
Article 164
1. The judgments of the Constitutional Court . . . shall

have the validity of resjudicatafrom the day following their
publication, and no appeal may be brought against them.
Those which declare the unconstitutionality of a law or a
rule with the force of law, and all those which are not limited to the subjective acknowledgement of a right, shall be
fully binding on all persons. 150
With far greater precision and clarity than the U.S. Constitution,
the Spanish Constitution made the Constitutional Tribunal
supreme. 151 Though its legal system is firmly rooted in the civil law
tradition,152 Spain "opted for a concentrated system of constitutional
adjudication, with exclusive jurisdiction to decide constitutional ques150. CONST. arts. 161, 163, 164.
151.

Note, The Spanish Constitutional Tribunalin Theory and Practice, 18 STAN. INT'L

L.J. 435 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Tribunal].
152. For an excellent background work on civil law, see J. MERRYMAN, supra note 148.
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tions vested in a small politically-appointed body composed primarily
of law professors with no prior judicial experience."'' 53 Indeed, so
important was this principal of constitutional supremacy that the first
organic law passed by the Cortes after it adopted the Constitutional
Tribunal was the Organic Law of the Constitutional Tribunal
(LOTC).154 The LOTC specifies the powers and responsibilities of the
Tribunal, satisfying the constitutional mandate that: "An organic law
shall regulate the functioning of the Constitutional Court, the statutes
of its members, the procedure to be followed before it, and the conditions governing actions brought before it."' 5 5
While the Cortes was fulfilling its constitutionally-imposed duty
to define the requirements of the Constitution with respect to the right
to counsel, the Constitutional Tribunal, armed with the powers
granted to it under the LOTC, was already applying the Constitution
to cases before it which could not await the enactment of implementing legislation. Indeed, the LOTC provides for speedy judicial review
which has been described as "blinding."' 5 6 Of course, the implementing legislation itself, eventually passed without reference to these decisions of the Court-some of which were sub judice while the Cortes
debated the right to counsel provisions-is also subject to future scru1 57
tiny by the Constitutional Tribunal.
B.

Selected Case Law

In December 1982, the Second Constitutional Tribunal, sitting in
Pamplona, annulled sentences of nine to eighteen years given to three
alleged ETA Commandos."5 8 The only proof of the crimes of violence
charged against the defendants were statements that they had made at
the police commissary upon their arrest. When they eventually
appeared in court, the prisoners repudiated those statements.
The Court held that declarations made without the guarantees of
article 17 of the Constitution-that is, without the assistance of counsel-"did not have the character of proof."' 5 9 The Court declared
153. Note, ConstitutionalTribunal, supra note 151, at 435-36.
154. Leyes Organicas Del Tribunal Constitucional [LOTC] (Spain); Note, Constitutional
Tribunal,supra note 151, at 437-39.

155.

CONST.

art. 165.

156. LOTC arts. 63-68. See also Note, ConstitutionalTribunal,supra note 151, at 44546.
157. Ironically, the Socialists, now the ruling party in Spain, threatened to have the
LOTC declared unconstitutional shortly after its adoption by the Cortes. The PSOE feared
that the Constitutional Tribunal had too much power, and that it constituted a third branch of
the Cortes. See generally El Pais, July 29, 1979, at 9, col. 1.
158. El Pais, Dec. 3, 1982, at 34, col. 2.
159. Id.
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that: "The only proof that served to condemn the defendants was
their confessions to the police, which were obtained without the constitutional guarantees which suppose the presence of counsel. In the
present case it is evident that only the confessions before the police
undercut the presumption of innocence."

160

The Court held that the

confessions would have been sufficient to serve as the basis of the sentence imposed only if they had been repeated and ratified in open
court.

The Court thus applied the rather general language of the Constitution to strike down a conviction in which it was undisputed that
the defendants had confessed without the presence of counsel. The
defendants, suspected terrorists, had been held pursuant to the statute

which permitted incommunicado detention, and had claimed
in court
161
that the statements they made were induced by torture.

This decision may sweep aside many of the technical qualifications placed on the right to counsel by article 520 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. While the statute permits statements to be made

without legal assistance if the lawyer fails to arrive within eight hours
of notification and makes counsel mandatory only at the formal declaration, this decision, if read broadly, might invalidate all statements
not made in the presence of counsel. 162 Of course, the case was
decided while the amendments were still under consideration, and it is
conceivable that subsequent decisions will hold that the qualifications
imposed on article 17.3 of the Constitution by the revised article 520
pass muster under the Spanish Constitution.
160. Id. at col. 3.
161. A U.S. court might well have reversed the conviction on the ground that the confessions were uncorroborated. See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954); Comment, Corroborationof ExtrajudicialStatements, 7 STAN. L. REV. 378 (1955). In addition, there is the
possibility of constitutional infirmity based on cases that prohibit the taking of statements
without the advice of rights and an informed waiver. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039
(1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
When to require a waiver and what constitutes a valid waiver are issues that have challenged U.S. courts. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (Miranda does not
require an express waiver, and waiver may be inferred from the circumstances). See also State
v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 250 S.E.2d 263 (1979) (where the defendant voluntarily accompanied
police to station, submitted to questioning and implicated himself in a murder, the North
Carolina Supreme Court looked at the totality of the circumstances and held the written confession obtained as a result of the questioning admissible). Cf.United States v. Gillyard, 726
F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1984) (suspect who waived Miranda rights before taking polygraph test
must be readvised of rights before post-polygraph interrogation).
162. However, the Spanish bench may hold, as U.S. courts have, that some police statements do not rise to the level of interrogation, and that statements volunteered by a suspect are
admissible. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (where the Court held that police
statements made after the defendant had requested counsel were not designed to elicit an
incriminating response from defendant and were thus not interrogation).
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In a subsequent decision, the same division of the Constitutional
Tribunal gave added force to the concept of assistance of counsel
when it set aside an appellate judgment affirming a conviction for
"dangerousness," where the defendant filed his appeal without the
assistance of counsel. 63 Although the defendant elected to appeal his
sentence without his lawyer, apparently because he could not locate
him, the Court nullified the conviction. It found that the principle of
equality between the state and the defendant demanded that the
164
defendant receive legal assistance in the appellate process.
The Court reached its conclusion by interpreting constitutional
and statutory provisions. Article 24.2 of the 1978 Constitution gives
' 165
all persons the right "to the defense and assistance of a lawyer."
This article reflected prevailing Spanish criminal procedure, which
provided a right of defense to all charged with punishable offenses and
required legal representation for defendants.1 66 The Court held that
the appeal was unconstitutionally denied when it was rejected because
it had not been made in the form required by law. Since the defendant had no lawyer, he could not effectively pursue the appeal, and the
requirement that he bring the appeal within three days or be barred
from bringing it later violated his right to a defense and to legal assistance in presenting his appeal.
Though this case deals with a phase beyond the initial confrontation between police and those suspected of crime, it does suggest that
the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal is prepared to implement expansively the human rights guarantees of the Constitution. It also indicates that at least some Spanish judges regard the assistance of
counsel as fundamental in the scheme of human rights, and are prepared to measure its scope not only in accordance with Spanish jurisprudence, but indeed as the Constitution itself mandates in article
10.2: "in accordance with the Universal Declaratidn of Human
' 167

Rights."

163. STC 42/1982, de 5 de julio (Sala Seqinda). Recurso de amparo num. 366/1981
(RA-56), 16-17 BOLETIN JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL 630 (Aug.-Sept. 1982).
164. Id.
165. In the United States, the emphasis on the unique protection afforded by the presence of an attorney (rather than another individual) was highlighted in Fare v. Michael C., 21
Cal.3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978). In Michael C., a juvenile requested the
presence of his probation officer, and the court held that this was not an invocation of the
Miranda right to remain silent. The court emphasized that only an attorney can effectively
protect a suspect's rights during interrogation and alleviate the inherently coercive nature of
police questioning.
166. L.E. CRiM. art. 118, which fleshes out this right, is reinforced by article 860 of the
Criminal Code, which requires appointment of counsel in those cases where defendants are
insolvent or otherwise unable to afford an attorney.
167. CONST. art. 10, para. 2 reads: "The principles relating to the fundamental rights
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A 1981 case in which the First Division of the Constitutional
Tribunal annulled a robbery conviction sheds further light on the
Spanish judiciary's perception of the importance of article 17.3. The
First Division's decision was predicated on the presumption of innocence guaranteed by article 24.2 of the Constitution and the guarantee
of assistance of counsel of article 17.2.168 The conviction had been
obtained on the basis of a confession taken without assistance of counsel, and the trial took place in 1976, two years prior to the adoption of
the Constitution. Even so, the Court annulled the conviction, holding
that the principles expressed by the Constitution were already part of
the criminal justice process, and a confession taken without the presence of counsel could not therefore offset the presumption of innocence, an overriding tenet of the present constitutional order.
Presumed innocent, the defendant could not be imprisoned or
fined without evidence that he had committed a crime. For an item of
proof to be considered evidence, the Court reasoned, it would have to
be tested judicially. Police testimony concerning statements alleged
to have been made by the defendant had the value of an accusation
only. In order to be admissible, such a confession would have to be
reiterated in court, at which time counsel would be present. In short,
the statement would have to be received with the protections afforded
by formal proceedings.
The opinion of the Court, and particularly its apparent retroactivity,' 69 suggest that the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal may, in the
future, measure convictions by a standard that would moot the questions debated by the Cortes. More likely, the Tribunal will moderate
its position relative to cases heard before passage of the legislation,
and overrule convictions only in cases where the defendant is unrepresented at the formal declaration, or where the rules set out in article
520 or article 527 have been violated. In all events, it seems likely
that if the Spanish judiciary continues on its way, it, like the United
States Supreme Court, will have the final word as to the nature and
extent of the right to counsel.

and liberties recognized by the Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and agreements thereon ratified
by Spain."
168. STC de 28 de julio de 1981 (Sala Primera). Recurso de amparo num. 113/1980

(RA-23),

BOLETIN JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL

439 (Oct. 6, 1981).

169. The opinion is rather confusing on the question of retroactivity. Certainly, none of
the detailed exposition which may be found in many U.S. decisions on this question appears in
the opinion. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
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CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court declared in Miranda v. Arizona that it was "impossible ... to foresee the potential alteration
which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of
their creative rule-making capacities," and that it could not say "that
the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solu1 70
tion for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process."
The Court "encourag[ed] Congress and the States to continue the
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights
of the individuals while promoting efficient enforcement of [the] criminal laws." 7 ' With this language, the Miranda Court acknowledged
the importance of the legislative process in the implementation of the
U.S. Constitution. Nonetheless, in the United States, the legislative
role in shaping the development of constitutional rights is peripheral.
"[T]he Constitution is what the judges say it is," '72 and there is, at
least in terms of tradition, no explicit role in the United States Constitution for congressional participation beyond the amendment process,1 7 3 rulemaking,' 74 withdrawing jurisdiction,175 and confirmation
76
or impeachment of judges.1

Spain presents a different situation, in which the role of the
national legislature in determining constitutional rights is more significant than that of the U.S. Congress.' 77 Study of legislative deliberations is thus more important to an appreciation of the extent of
constitutional rights in Spain than it is in the United States. As in
statutory construction in the United States, ascertaining legislative
intent is important in determining the meaning of the Spanish Consti7
tution, in a way unknown in U.S. jurisprudence. 1
Theoretical positions maintained prior to the legislative debates
went through a metamorphosis. The Socialists, burdened with the
responsibility of government, permitted internal security considera170. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
171. Id.
172. The phrase is that of Chief Justice Hughes, from a speech given on May 3, 1907
when he was Governor of New York. Hughes declared: "We are under a Constitution, but
the Constitution is what the judges say it is .. " L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969 Vol. III, 1896 (1969).
173. U.S. CONST. art. V.
174. Cf Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
175. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 2.
176. Id. art. II, § 2, para. 2.
177. Of course, the first few judicial decisions under the constitutional regime suggest
that Spanish judges are likely to move considerably further and faster with the engine ofjudicial review than the compromise-derived legislation of the Spanish Parliament. See supra notes
158-69 and accompanying text.
178. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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tions to play a major role in shaping their legislative proposals for
fixing the terms of the right to counsel. This shift can be seen in the
difference between the initial proposals of the Ministry of Justice,
which favored defendants, and the subsequent compromise with the
Ministry of the Interior. As a result of this compromise, police security operations are not hampered by a process designed to insulate the
defendant from police overreaching at all costs, as they might have
been under the Ministry of Justice proposal.
The origins and sympathies of the political factions which sought
to amend the government's proposals were instrumental in shaping
their law enforcement agenda. On the extreme left, the Communists
either proposed legislation or attempted amendments which radically
departed from the practices of the Francoist era.179 The Communist
Party's proposals, if adopted, would have led to a position most consistent with a regime of personal liberty. The regionalist parties, such
as the Grupo Parliamentario Mixto and the Basques, were naturally
supportive of measures which would loosen the grip of the Madrid
government on the other provinces of Spain. But a genuine belief in
liberal democracy and its institutions was also undoubtedly an important motivation in regionalist support for protection of suspects. In
addition, as the debates demonstrated, the old fear of the forces of
internal security and of Francoist hegemony insured support for laws
which would check the power of the police. As the Socialists wanted
to insure their capacity to govern and to prevent the disintegration of
Spain, so the regionalists wanted a Spain in which, except for the
Francoist era, autonomy and non-intervention were characteristic of
the Spanish political experience.
This article has sought to describe these clashes of viewpoint and
attempted to trace the confluence of positions as they merged into the
legislation presently in force. While the commanding Socialist majorities in the Cortes make it difficult to calibrate the impact of minority
points of view, it is beyond argument that some minority positions
were influential. Specific modifications of the government's legislation
were obtained. Moreover, the extent to which the government moderated its position in anticipation of objections from the minority parties
179. The Communists' proposed amendments conformed to the traditional perception of
"Eurocommunism." "Eurocommunism" is the term used to describe the type of communism
typically espoused in Western European countries. This communism stresses civil and political rights. Moreover, unlike the communist ideology typified by the Soviet Union, Eurocommunism promotes change through existing systems of parliamentary democracy. See generally
S. CARRILLO, EUROCOMMUNISM AND THE STATE (1978); CUNY CONFERENCE ON HISTORY
AND POLITICS, 1978, EUROCOMMUNISM, THE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL-THEORETICAL

FOUNDATIONS (G. Schwab ed. 1981). See also Mujal-Le6n, The Spanish Communists and the
Search for ElectoralSpace, in SPAIN AT THE POLLS, supra note 7, at 161, 170, 176.
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can never be totally demonstrated, especially given the governing
party's historically powerful position in the Cortes. Clearly, there was
pressure from the left, including the press and political institutions, to
nudge the government along the civil liberties path. Much of the government's presentation was defensive, and here again political positions were more important than reasoned analysis in fleshing out
constitutional detail.
At least at the level of discourse, the Francoist legacy was largely
discredited. The old dictator's institutions were overthrown seriatim,
and ironically only the King survived attacks on the old order, as he
saved the new government in its time of greatest danger. 8 ' Thus,
legitimacy was, for most, measured by the distance from the authoritarian past. While there existed in some sectors a yearning for the
romantic simplicity of fascist rule, most of the influential sections of
Spanish society realized that time had passed Spain by, and that if
Franco marked a stage along the road of modernization through consolidation of the Spanish nation, the old institutions of political domination were in every sense outmoded and out of step with the march
of other Western nations.1 81
Unlike the U.S. experience, the Spanish Constitution's implementation was forged in the give and take of legislative exchange.
Political considerations were thus not only implicit, as perhaps they
are in the United States, but were expressed and linked to broader
political agendas. The connection between political party and constitutional provision was direct in a way unknown in the U.S.
experience.
The Spanish experience thus bears continued observation. Its
nascent steps toward judicial review are part of the postwar drive
toward constitutionalism, and can be expected, with the singularity
and uniqueness characteristic of the Spanish, to significantly check
parliamentary supremacy. But simultaneously, and of more consequence beyond Spain's frontiers, is the example of an elected parlia180. See The FranquistaCoup that Failed, TIME, Mar. 9, 1981, at 22, which chronicles
the resourcefulness of Franco's handpicked heir in frustrating the ambitions of the dictator's

latter-day adherents. In the end, the King literally rescinded the proclamation of martial law
which had been designed to facilitate the overthrow of the constitutional regime. BOLETIN
JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL 439-45 (Oct. 6, 1981).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27. Spanish achievement compares very
favorably with reforms in other countries with a history of totalitarian rule. Compare the
development of these rights in Germany, J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977); the U.S.S.R., Huskey, The Politics of the Soviet CriminalProcess:
Expanding the Right to Counsel in Pre-TrialProceedings, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1986); and
the People's Republic of China, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 171 (1982) (a translation of
the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China).
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ment shaping the contours of human liberty. The U.S. experience has
largely been that of an elitist institution guarding the interests of political minorities. The Spanish adventure should test the capacity of
majoritarian institutions both to protect human rights and to govern
effectively.

